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Swedish social democracy is in crisis. Hopes (or fears) that Sweden would 
undergo a democratic socialist transformation have been dashed for some time 
(Pontusson, 1987). But furthermore, it has become increasingly clear in the 1990s 
that welfare capitalism is being dismantled to facilitate "self-regulating markets" 
also in Sweden. Mass unemployment has become a reality in what previously 
was the model of a full employment society. Moreover successive budgets and 
crisis packages - "bourgeois", Social Democratic, and multipartisan - have 
reduced social insurance entitlement-levels and services. Some may suggest that 
"crisis" is too strong a word to describe this. They may point to the fact that 
Sweden's economy is being "restabilized" at an impressive rate, with still 
comparatively high levels of welfare entitlements and low levels of poverty. But 
this is to miss the point. First, continued low rates of GDP- and productivity 
growth and high levels of unemployment will result in further cutbacks that, in 
turn, will undermine what is left of the universalist welfare state. Second, the 
present direction of state policy is totally out of step with public opinion. This 
indicates that there is a profound divide between the increasingly neoliberal 
paradigm of Swedish elites and the continued welfarist "common sense" of the 
Swedish people (Svallfors, 1989; 1996). There is, in other words, a crisis of 
representation and hegemony (Gramsci, 1971).
How should one make sense of this crisis? I suggest that one starts with 
the rather obvious premise that Sweden is a small country dependent on its 
international environment. This reality is generally acknowledged, but the 
consequences are rarely taken in works on the Swedish Model. Generally cast in 
a comparativist mould, where the nation state is the ultimate "unit of analysis", 



























































































national institutions (cf. Gourevitch, 1976). Despite their essential contributions, 
I would argue that a one-sided comparativist focus cannot generate an adequate 
understanding of the problem at hand. This is because the Swedish Model 
fundamentally presupposed the post World War II "embedded liberal" world 
order and the process of neoliberal globalization is central to its crisis. This 
article seeks to demonstrate this. It accounts for the distinct but integral domestic 
and global politico-economic forces that underpinned and undermined the 
Swedish Model.
The studies of Katzenstein (1983; 1985) and Mjoset et.al (1986; 1987) 
have already contributed to such an analysis. Katzenstein develops a useful 
structural functional account of how the Swedish Model, as one of the "small 
corporatist states", succeeded to mediate international competitiveness with 
extensive social welfare provision. But the validity of his account is only 
restricted to the postwar order, and he cannot deal with the implications of 
neoliberal globalization. Mjoset et.al's regulation theoretical study goes beyond 
Katzenstein's work in this regard. It probes the world economic dynamics of the 
crisis of Fordism, and their implications for Nordic welfare capitalism. Hence 
this important work accounts for the implications for the Swedish Model of 
technological and organizational mutations in the social relations of production 
and in the world economy. But, like much of regulation theory, it fails to 
integrate a rigorous analysis of political and ideological processes, with the 
analysis of narrowly conceived economic processes.
Historical-structural, critical International Political Economy, as defined 
by Cox (1981; 1987: 1-9) could provide important relief here. This article 
follows Cox's general framework and method, which considers "politics" and 
"economics", "world order" and "forms of state" as temporally bounded and 




























































































before this approach can effectively address my problematic, it must undergo 
further elaboration and development. This is, of course, inherent to the approach 
itself. "Historicist concepts" must always be elaborated in the concrete context in 
which they are applied (Braudel, 1958; Cox, 1983). But in addition, further 
conceptual refinement is needed on a more general and abstract level, to facilitate 
persuasive analysis of the interrelations of world order dynamics and state- 
society complexes. First, a political economy analysis of historic blocs require a 
regulation-theoretical dimension to explain how circuits of capital accumulation 
are politically stabilized into reproductive orders.2 Second, much more attention 
must be given to the institutional forms through which regulation and social 
representation takes place. Despite the label "form of state", Cox tends to treat 
state relations rather instrumentally, as epiphenomena of substantive hegemonic 
ideology.
The overall theme of my argument is that it is important to neither reduce 
the crisis of social democracy to a set of external constraints totally outside the 
control of social democratic actors, nor to argue that nothing fundamental in the 
structural environment has changed, and that the crisis is simply an effect of a 
betrayal of ideas by social democratic elites. The former approach ignores actual 
tactical and strategic failures of actors, fails to appreciate alternative options and 
strategies that might have been pursued and that might provide lessons also for 
the future. The latter approach ignores the profound structural change that has 
taken place, and that has redefined the terms of social democratic politics. What I 
attempt to do here is to provide a careful reconstruction of the interconnected and 
overdetermined relationships of structure and agency that have generated the 
crisis of Swedish social democracy and redefined the strategic terrain of such a 
politics.




























































































of Swedish social democracy as such is suspended to the last part. This is 
because this analysis presupposes an explanation of what the shift from an 
embedded liberal world order to "neoliberal globalization" actually entails (part 
one). The analysis of a crisis also presupposes a specification of what actually is 
in crisis. Hence, the second part accounts for the modus operandi and conditions 





























































































I understand neoliberal globalization to express a historic bloc in 
formation, which is emerging on the terrain of the crisis of the embedded liberal 
bloc of Pax Americana (Ruggie, 1983). It involves at its economic core highly 
constraining infrastructural technological developments. But equally important, it 
also entails developments of a more contingent nature. Socio-economically this 
formation entails a shift away from Fordist ex ante integrated mass production 
and consumption to an emphasis on automation, flexible specialization, 
internationalization of production, a reduction of turnover time, and risk 
management. Socio-politically it entails the tendential developments of new 
constitutionalist forms of rule and a transnational^ hegemonic neo-liberal social 
purpose. Its project is to deepen and extend commodification of social life; that 
is, to universalize a form of social integration that is based on the logic of self- 
regulating markets. Although strong forces are pulling for this formation, its 
institutional stability is not yet ensured. This section elaborates on central 
properties and contradictions of this world order development, and contrasts it 
with the preceding embedded liberal order.
Changing Régimes of Capital Accumulation
While American hegemony ensured the survival of capitalism after World 
War II, production norms and the power balance of social forces limited the 
scope and extent of commodification. Embedded liberalism was based on a 
"politics of productivity" (Maier, 1977), typically forged by forces associated 
with industrial capital, organized labour, and reformist technocrats. It ensured 
collective bargaining rights, low unemployment levels and high social wages for 




























































































manage and peaceful industrial relations. As a result of the ensuing "labour 
peace", production could be organized according to Taylorist principles, applying 
product specific machinery on a large scale. The productivity increases that 
resulted, together with ex ante integrated Fordist wage norms, Keynesian 
economic policy, and sometimes Beveridgian social policy, ensured coherent 
intensive regimes of accumulation, that provided a co-evolution of non- 
inflationary growth and increased standards of living (Lipietz, 1987: 24-32).2 An 
important precondition for this mode of regulation was the subordination of 
"circulation forms" of capital (which tend to favour market clearing and price 
stability), to "productive capital" (which in Fordist/Taylorist conditions tended to 
favour returns to scale), facilitated by the 1929 Wall Street crash, the New Deal, 
the collapse of the liberal trade system in the 1930s, and wartime economic 
planning (van der Pijl, 1984; 1995).
The "stagflation crisis" of the 1970s signalled the end to this Fordist form 
of accumulation. A catalyst to stagflation was the pricing-strategy of OPEC, but 
more fundamentally it was an expression of Taylorist production norms reaching 
their socio-technological frontiers. Productivity growth declined, and could no 
longer underwrite aggregate demand expansion (Lipietz, 1987). Since the world 
recession of 1979-80 a new form of capital accumulation is emerging, and it 
constitutes the "economic core" of neoliberal globalization. "Post-Fordism" 
entails a refraction of production relations in a number of identifiable 
dimensions. With the rise of a new core technology (informatics and computer 
technology based on the "microchip revolution"), which facilitates the 
optimization of allocation decisions, and increases productivity by breaking 
down information bottlenecks, the process of internationalization o f production 
has accelerated (Kaplinsky 1984). Cybernetics also imply a secular trend of 




























































































has radically altered the terms of the organization of the labour process. 
Cybernetics can now be used to create "general purpose" machines, that facilitate 
competition through "flexible specialization", rather than "economies of scale" 
(Piore and Sabel 1984: 194-280). These new terms for corporate strategy make 
more ambiguous the relationship between the economies of scope and scale. As a 
result, productive capital tends to perceive less of a dependence on nationally 
generated mass consumption.
A second, more spectacular aspect of economic globalization is the 
transformation of international monetary institutions and global financial 
markets. This was in part due to the maturation and crisis of Fordism, leading to 
an expansion of international commerce and demand for credit (the "fiscal crises" 
of states). But the development has been enhanced and gained momentum 
through the revolution of information technology. The emergence of the 
"Eurodollar-" and other "offshore" markets, the flexible exchange rate system, 
mounting government debt, and the growing asymmetries between creditor and 
debtor nations radically increased the velocity and volume of capital flows and 
the demand for credit supplied by the private sector. These secular trends, 
together with the absence of action of states, have radically altered the sources 
and forms of movement of international credit. The "quasi-public" multilateral 
credit system of Bretton Woods has given way to a deeply commodified, market 
mediated, "private, multi-centred, global" credit system (Germain, 1992). 
Consequently high finance has become so powerful in the allocation of economic 
resources that it has been described as the pivotal agent in the formation of the 
emerging global hegemony (Cox, 1987: 267). Economically, this reflects a 
subsumption of productive forms of capital to circulation forms of capital. 
Rentier profit has increased in importance relative to profit from production, and 




























































































the reduction of labour costs, rather than through productivity increases and mass 
consumption (van der Pijl, 1984: 265-86; 1995:; Harvey, 1990: chs. 10 and 11).
This changing form of capital accumulation has certainly changed the cost- 
benefit structure of capitalists in relation to the welfare state. But not only have 
the interests of capital changed in favour of deeper commodification, 
individuation, and market clearing; and against public welfare provision and 
collective bargaining. The structural power of capital to realize its preferred 
forms of accumulation and regulation has increased as a result of an emerging 
territorial non-correspondence (pace Murray, 1971) between markets and states 
(Gill and Law, 1989). Through transnational mobility, capital can counter 
attempts at regulation by states - which in this context are in competition for 
scarce investment resources - and make the essence of the raison d'etat to court 
to this structural power. "Business confidence", now more than ever, determines 
the direction of capital flows, the availability of finance, and future investments, 
upon which future production, employment, and tax revenue depends.
Some would argue that the term "globalization" expresses nothing more 
than the bourgeois ideological obfuscation of this change of the spatial fix of 
capital accumulation, and its attendant effects on social power relations.4 There is 
much to be said for this, as a reaction against cliche-ridden phrases on the "need 
to adjust to the global market-place". But one must not forget that the ideology is 
part of the reality that needs to be explained. Particular forms of capital 
accumulation depend on particular forms of regulation. These are only 
adequately analyzed with reference not only to economic, but also political and 
ideological factors.
"New Constitutionalism" and the "G-7 Nexus"




























































































of production as such. One important insight of Piore and Sahel's (1984) 
pioneering work on flexible specialization remains valid: technological shifts are 
to some extent open ended, and many forms of "post-Fordism" can be conceived. 
Indeed, as they and others have argued (eg. Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988; Boyer, 
1991), general purpose machines may be more efficiently appropriated in more 
collectivist production paradigms emphasizing functional flexibility through 
codetermination, and the public goods of training and R&D. Moreover, global 
finance has not re- emerged as a consequence or dimension of post-Fordism. IPE 
literature has since long persuasively argued that the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods depended decisively on more strictly political factors (eg Strange, 1986; 
Block, 1977). The early initiatives of financial deregulation did not so much 
reflect a neoliberal hegemonic strategy as short sightedness, actions informed by 
state interest without an "ethico-political" resolve to sustain the embedded liberal 
monetary regime (expressing hegemonic crisis). But since the "Volcker-shock" in 
1979, monetarist policy coordination and capital deregulation has increasingly 
been driven by a hegemonic neoliberal strategy (Helleiner, 1994: 123-68). The 
emerging neoliberal form of rule and transnational macroeconomic regulation is 
based on what Stephen Gill (1991; 1992; 1993) has called a "new 
constitutionalism".
New constitutionalism contrasts sharply with the "double screen" of the 
Bretton Woods. The latter was sustained by the dollar-based fixed exchange rate 
regime, and public multilateral norms governing capital controls and flows. The 
purpose of the double screen was to facilitate a simultaneous balance of both 
international and domestic economic activity close to full employment.5 As a 
result, North-North trade could flourish and ensure a mutual validation of the 
Fordist intensive accumulation regimes in the capitalist core. Expansionist 




























































































important to ensure sustained aggregate demand, and to facilitate expansionary 
policies in West European economies.6 The "double screen", however, broke 
down in the 1970s as the "Triffm's dilemma”7 became increasingly acute, and as 
the US vetoed a public multilateral reform of the monetary regime, based on 
Special Drawing Rights.
Whereas the double screen ensured the capacity of states to manage 
aggregate demand and to mitigate market generated social disruptions, new 
constitutionalism deliberately reshapes state-market boundaries so as to 
maximize the exposure of states to international capital markets. New 
constitution implies a deliberate abdication from discretionary state action that 
violates market norms (the metaphor of Ulysses tying himself to the mast is often 
invoked). Thereby the classical liberal separation between state- and economic 
forms is politically enforced. The purpose is to create a buffer against demands 
for protection against market effects, and to discipline social actors to conform to 
market constrains and criteria. Globalization, then, is not only a matter of the 
structural power of capital constraining states. State-actors deliberately mobilize 
the structural power of global capital in a neoliberal strategy (Panitch, 1994). 
This is the political Raison d'être behind the increased emphasis on Central Bank 
autonomy, and capital and currency deregulation. An important effect of this is 
that a neoliberal variant of post-Fordism is promoted, as, for example, 
unemployment generated by austerity policies reduces the bargaining power of 
organized labour on the shopfloor.
It is a misunderstanding that globalization equals the end of the nation 
state. National agencies and instruments of economic policy, and by extension 
the inter-state system, have remained central to new constitutionalism. The 
territorial non-correspondence between the operation of markets and states has 




























































































from which to exit). Consequently, positive international economic policy, for 
example coordination monetary and exchange rate policy, takes place through 
loose, ad hoc "inter-governmental" arrangements, within general constitutive 
framework-arrangements like free trade treaties. As in the embedded liberal 
system, this allows for a privileged role for the predominant state, what neo­
realists call "the hegemon", to shape intergovemmentalism and to reap certain 
exclusive benefits. Despite a "relative" decline the United States has retained this 
position (Strange, 1987). But apart from the change from an embedded- to a 
neoliberal social purpose, the US has also pursued a more "minimalist" 
hegemony since the Reagan presidency (Cafruny, 1989). This implies that the US 
has used its unique structural power, emanating for example from it "seignorage" 
position of providing the world currency, to pursue a narrow self interest policy 
to sustain domestic economic growth at the expense of the world economy as a 
whole (eg Davis, 1984; Lipietz, 1989).8 Most significantly perhaps was the 
American macroeconomic policy stance in the 1980s. The combination of an 
expansionary fiscal policy (due to military expenditure and tax cuts) and tight 
monetary policy drained liquidity and finance from international markets. This is 
of course in sharp contrast to the role played by the US as a supplier of liquidity 
and finance in the Bretton Woods system.
This loose articulation of formal policy mechanisms is accompanied by a 
tighter articulation of a common substantive hegemonic strategy of a 
transnational power bloc, that can aptly be labelled the "G7-nexus" (Gill, 1993, 
1994). Its cohesion is articulated through private-informal fora (such as the 
Trilateral Commission and the Pinay Circle), as well as public-formal fora (such 
as the OECD, IMF and the Bank of International Settlements) (Gill, 1990; 1994; 
van der Pijl, 1984; 1995). It also permeates key branches of state structures, such 




























































































these transnational fora. Apart from its neoliberal ideology, this power bloc 
differs from the embedded liberal bloc in its exclusion of organized labour, and 
in its lack of tolerance of autonomy of the technocratic managerial strata from 
business interests, and the subordination of productive capital to financial capital 
(Ibid.).
In order to trace this socio-political dimension of neoliberal globalization, 
one needs to go back to consider the reaction of elites against the international 
radicalization wave in the early 1970s, that was interpreted as "a crisis of 
govemability" (Huntington). This highlights how conditional the "embedded" 
dimension of Pax Americana actually was. The welfarist material concessions 
after World War 11 need to be considered in the context of the Cold War, and the 
need to integrate the highly organized European working class, with socialist 
propensities. Union cadres served an important function in producing mass 
consent to American hegemony (van der Pijl, 1984). But the material concessions 
had to be consistent with capital accumulation and American geo-political 
strategy. Social democrats, organized labour, and even left-liberals broke with 
these terms when they attempted to co-opt, but also accommodate, peace 
activists, Third World advocates, feminists, and rank and file militants reacting 
against the discrepancy of the myth and reality of "the affluent society". But these 
political expressions of legitimation crisis did not form into a coherent counter- 
hegemonic force. Moreover, the attendant extension of welfare reform and the 
New International Economic Order that were nevertheless attempted contradicted 
with business interests. It was in the context of this failed radicalization wave, the 
economic problems of stagflation, and what was considered the potentially 
subversive effects of inflationary Keynesianism, that business and economic 
policy elites successfully took an increasingly antagonistic stance against unions, 




























































































(1986) has called the "Second Cold War" enhanced this tendency.
Tensions and Contradictions
The prospects of success of the emerging transnational power bloc should 
not be underestimated. Many, notably neo-realists, have pointed to the absence of 
a single dominating state to provide the international public goods for global 
cooperation. However, in the new era, with a structurally different relationship 
between markets and states, a transnational power bloc may not need such a 
realist "hegemon". According to Helleiner (1992), hyper-liberal financial and 
monetary regimes (as opposed to Keynesian ones), based on private multi centric 
finance, might function better without a dominant state.9 Since accumulation is 
ensured through decreased turnover time, cost-cutting, and labour shedding, 
rather than through an articulation of mass consumption and mass production, the 
deflationary effects of neo-liberalism may not be as detrimental to capital 
accumulation as they would have been on the Fordist era (Harvey, 1990). In a 
nutshell, neo-liberalism may be viable because the ability of transnational capital 
to regulate itself has increased. At the same time, the capacity of the nation state 
to pursue market inhibiting regulation has decreased, and the social forces which 
stand to benefit from such regulation find it increasingly difficult to organize the 
relational power necessary to make politically effective demands.
On the other hand, a global neo-liberal order is not predestined to sustain 
itself. After the "Reagan Boom", an increasingly self-regulating capitalism is 
characterized by deep recessions and extremely sluggish recoveries, that seem as 
no more than a pause for the next recession. In this context, high real interest 
rates produced by the interaction between the private multi-centric financial 
system and states in fiscal crisis, and budget cutbacks may prove to be fatal. 




























































































adaptation of "post-Fordist" flexible specialization. It may hinder the acquisition 
of public goods such as training of skilled labour, and a fertile cooperative 
workplace environment where "learning by doing" can be exploited to the fullest 
(Hyman and Streeck, 1988; Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988) In addition, the 
shortening of time horizons in investment and the rents paid to the financial 
sector to manage the risk it largely generates itself (Strange, 1986) may hinder a 
sustained, paradigmatic shift into the new technological growth trajectory 
altogether unless effective demand can be boosted. Thus, it may be that the 
capitalist accumulation process has not freed itself from the imperative of returns 
to scale (Boyer, 1987: 10-16; 1991). On the socio-political level, the increased 
inequalities, implied in the dismantling of the welfare state, mass unemployment, 
the polarization of the labour market, as well as the failure of the neo-liberal 
regime to manage environmental crises generate antagonisms and social forces 
which may yet challenge the order. The gordian knot for such social forces, 
however, is to mobilize and link sufficient power on the local, national, and 
global level to challenge the structural power of capital.
There are also important antagonisms at the core of the G-7 nexus. 
Although the pivotal globalizing elite-stratum is in agreement on the need to 
exert monetarist discipline, and reduce social public consumption, there are 
significant differences in outlook on how to regulate the world economy. The 
principal division runs between financial consortia and states of the Anglo-Saxon 
heartland, and those of continental Europe ("Rhineland Capitalism") and Japan 
(van der Pijl, 1995). In the latter regions there are strong state capitalist 
traditions, productive capital is still relatively prominent and social democracy 
and/or traditional conservatism are relatively strong as political movements. Here 
one tends to find support for "compensatory liberalism" (Gill, 1994). The 




























































































liberalism in that in certain instances it pragmatically promotes the displacement 
of market mechanism in favour of public norms, for the purpose of ensuring 
consistency and disciplining certain collective actors so they will act according to 
market rationality (e.g fixed exchange rate norms rather than floating exchange 
rates, and public targets for borrowing and inflation rates). Compensatory 
liberalism may come into conflict with hyper-liberalism on a transnational level, 
where the former ideology may promote "strong" transnational regimes of 
constitutionalist regulation, while the latter would rather abstain from such 
regulation and "leave things to the market".
The hyper-liberal/compensatory liberal divide is also significant in relation 
to the forging of popular consent. While it predominates in policy discourse, neo­
liberalism has not been diffused adequately to the popular strata in the 
"Rhineland capitalist" areas. Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties 
may have adopted neoliberal policies, but in the popular arena they still tend to 
stick to their traditional welfarist images and discourse. This is in sharp contrast, 
of course, with the populism of Thatcher and Reagan, who also managed to 
restructure the "common sense" of civil society (Hall, 1988). This lack of a 
fusion between policy and a positive popular project makes "compensatory 
liberalism" politically unstable and vulnerable.
The conflict between compensatory- and hyper-liberals is related to the 
basic paradox of capitalist socialization, that the private realm must be politically 
constituted: "Laissez faire is planned" (Polanyi, 1944). While capitalism is 
essentially based on self-regulation, such regulation can only take place within 
the framework of law (especially contract law) and order, when certain common 
standards are set, and when certain "public goods" are provided. This need for 
social regulation is experienced more acutely by productive capital-fractions than 




























































































the process of realizing profit (e.g the need for stable labour conditions, technical 
standardizations and innovations, the assurance of a stable capital-value of 
machinery.) This paradox of laissezfaire actually points to its limits, and opens 
spaces for resistance, compromise, and the undermining of the logic of 
commodification, and counter-hegemonic projects. Capital is dependent upon the 
public realm, which in turn depends on legitimation and mass loyalty, vulnerable 
to popular mobilization. The territorial non-correspondence of globalization 
blunts the force of these counter-tendencies. But they are re-emerging on 
macroregional terrains. Regional economic integration requires standards for 
goods, patents, dispute-settlement mechanisms, and currency stability. This 
requirement for capital has a tendency to contradict the territorial non­
correspondence, and provides a site on which questions beyond, and even 
against, the interests of capital can be brought onto the agenda. Hence the 
formation of macroeconomic blocs become important in the search for 
alternatives to neoliberalism.
Consider, for example, the process behind "Europe 1992". It reflected the 
global developments outlined above (eg Holman, 1992). The creation of the 
single market, as laid out in Lord Cockfield's White Paper is quite consistent with 
the neo-liberal strategy on a global scale. The principle of "subsidiarity" can be 
seen as a cunning attempt to ensure simultaneously sufficient common norms, 
while ensuring the territorial non-correspondence of new constitutionalism (see 
Grahl & Teague, 1989). However, behind the consensus over the single market 
one can discern the attempt to assert a competing accumulation strategy. The 
Social Democratic federalist ex-President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, 
envisioned a transnational "neo-Fordist" Europe, where regimes of social and 
environmental standards, transnational macroeconomic policy regimes, and a 




























































































would also diffuse it to the periphery. Delors advanced this agenda by pursuing a 
"Russian doll" strategy, where at every stage of integration, he managed to secure 
vague commitments from member states for further regulation, which he then 
vigorously pursued at timely moments (Ross, 1992).
But this vision has been hampered not only by the political weakness of 
European Social Democracy and the labour movement, it has also been rendered 
improbable by the daunting task of creating the required new transnational 
institutions. Unanimity is required to make the Social Charter binding. At the 
present it is merely a diluted statement of principles, a dilution that reflects the 
compromises necessary to make it exist at all. Moreover, by using the "exit" 
option, and tactical alliances with various other members, Britain has managed to 
stall any real progress on "social Europe" (Rhodes, 1991). The compromises of 
the Maastricht Accord has had the effect of creating a European Union consistent 
with compensatory liberalism, reflecting the strength of continental Christian 
democracy, and hyper-liberal and social democratic forces "cancelling each other 
out". There is no legal clout in the social commitments of Maastricht.
There is, however, a commitment to a transnational macroeconomic policy 
implied in the Monetary Union. But the institutional design of the EMU reflects 
the monetarist objectives of the Bundesbank, not a Social Democratic neo- 
Fordist Europe. It is important to emphasize, though, that Maastricht does not 
signify a stable crystallization of EC/EU institutions. The speculative financial 
movements of 1993 effectively destroyed the EMS as it was, and has made the 
EMU-project very problematic to implement. The response of this has been to 
implement "Maastricht convergence programs" in member-countries, demanding 
unpopular budgetary cutbacks that further enforce austerity tendencies and 
unemployment rates. But even Germany has serious difficulties to meet the 




























































































what remains of the welfare state, without jeopardizing popular-political power. 
In other words, at least in Europe, a stable order has not yet crystallized, and in 
the longer term the actual content of monetary and economic union might be 
open for contest. As a result, rather than being an instrument to enforce new- 




























































































III. THE SWEDISH MODEL
The definitional account of world order developments of the previous 
section was necessary to support my thesis, that the Swedish Model presupposed 
the postwar embedded liberal order and that neoliberal globalization is central to 
its crisis. The rest of the paper is devoted to the pursuit of this argument. The 
embedded liberal order of the postwar period was created in the image of, and 
reflected the interests of, the specifically American growth and productivity 
coalition forged through the New Deal. But this world order was also consistent 
with the power blocs of other Western states. This hegemonic consent was partly 
based upon socio-political convergence, and partly upon American political and 
ideological intervention, which purged unacceptable radical elements from the 
other Western power blocs. Pax Americana did set definite limits to possible 
variations. But this is not to say that there were no important variations between 
the Western state-society complexes. They ranged from the relatively market 
oriented, "residual" welfare states of the Anglo-Saxon world, to the dirigiste 
models of state capitalism of France and Japan, and the meso-corporatist 
organized-capitalist German Model. They also included the labour inclusive 
"institutional", Social Democratic, welfare capitalism of Scandinavia. These 
variations matter both with regards to comparative economic performance and 
outcome, and they generated variations in crisis trajectories. Here the 
distinctiveness and specificity of the Swedish Model is described, with due 
attention to its interpellation into "Pax Americana".
Social Democratic Hegemony
Because the formative events that forged Sweden's politics of productivity 
took place already in the 1930s, a certain distinctiveness of the Swedish Model 




























































































without external theoretical, ideological, and cultural influences, the Swedish 
Model was decisively forged "organically" and internally. One distinct
dimension of the Swedish Model was the national-popular, hegemonic, role 
played by the reformist-socialist labour movement. The Swedish labour 
movement was one of the very few movements with Second International roots, 
that acquired a hegemonic role in the postwar period. As Korpi (1978; 1983) and 
Esping-Andersen (1985a; 1985b) have argued, this "historic compromise" had to 
reflect the social image and promote the articulated interests of the labour 
movement in a manner that was not possible where labour movements played a 
more subordinate role. The "social citizenship state" was based on full 
employment, "de-commodified" distribution and universal provision of social 
benefits This not only presupposed, but also served to reproduce solidarity, unity 
and hence mobilizational power of the labour.
An important aspect of social democratic hegemony was that the labour 
movement managed to forge and maintain an alliance with agrarian forces. This 
prevented the formation of an alliance between financiers, industrialists, and 
agrarian interests; alliances that tended to water down the interventionist density 
in the mode of regulation in favour of market norms (Gourevitch, 1978; Weir and 
Skocpol, 1985). This point is of crucial significance. It made possible in Sweden 
a "Kaleckian" (1943) mode of regulation, with a principled commitment to full 
employment. In the typical liberal, American and "vulgar" Keynesianism that 
emerged after the war, employment merely became one variable in the policy 
matrix of stability.10
The hegemonic position of social democracy should not be seen as 
inconsistent with the existence of capitalist relations of production, or a capitalist 
"ruling class" in the structuralist Marxist sense. Most fundamentally, ownership 




























































































its basic functions for capital accumulation. This implied that the structural 
power of capital inherent in the valorization process remained as a significant 
force, particularly because of the export-dependence of the Swedish economy. 
Swedish capital was also highly organized into three bank-centred spheres of 
interlocking owner- and directorships (Hermansson, 1989). This internal 
coherence was enhanced by the influential role played by the employers' 
association, SAF, representing employers in collective bargaining. Indeed, it 
enabled SAF to take the initiative - albeit in response to union power - in shaping 
Sweden's centralist collective bargaining arrangements (Fulcher, 1991). This 
coherence also ensured for SAF a certain influence over state policy. But rather 
than mobilizing an ideology of "national popular leadership" SAFs strategy vis a 
vis the state was to provide "technical advice" through participation in public 
commissions, tripartite boards, and through the creation and financing of research 
institutes (eg. Soderpalm, 1976; Therbom, 1989: 146-49). This was a "non 
hegemonic" accumulation strategy: economic-corporate interests of business 
were promoted and their private economic prerogatives of ownership and control 
of the means of production were guarded, but within an ethico-political 
framework primarily shaped by the social democrats (Ryner, 1996).
The Swedish Model not only implied a balance of power and compromise 
of competing material interests, but also an intersubjective "consensus". This 
consensus should not be understood in terms of total agreement. The major actors 
had their different understandings of the Swedish Model (Jenson and Mahon, 
1993 cf. Pekkarinen, 1989): It could be seen as a modernization of capitalism 
rendering class struggle and ideology irrelevant, a "middle way", or as a stage on 
the way to socialism. These interpretations corresponded to competing interests. 
For organized capital, the Swedish Model provided a way to cope with labour 




























































































rider problem in wage setting (Swenson, 1991). For organized labour the 
Swedish Model ensured increased real wages for its members, job security, and a 
means to reproduce a "moral" conception of wage distribution within the labour 
collective (Swenson, 1989)."
The central articulating principle of this consensus was "rationalization". It 
facilitated communication and mediation for compromises and policy formation 
(De Geer, 1978; Johansson, 1989; Hirdman, 1992; Ryner, 1996; 104-15). 
Business elites were interpellated to the rationalization discourse through 
"scientific management", which when extended to public policy also provided a 
business rationale for certain social reforms (health and safety norms, education, 
population policy). Labour was interpellated into this discourse through 
reformist-Marxist and proto-Marxist interpretations emphasizing the 
emancipatory potential of "organized capitalism" (Prominent intellectual 
influences were Austro-Marxist of Otto Bauer, but also domestic variants of 
Ernst Wigforss, Gustav Moller, Nils Karleby, and LO's Sigfrid Hansson.) 
Academic intellectuals of the functionalist movement, in economics, engineering, 
social work and architecture played a particularly important role in formulating 
and forging compromises between the social groups. A particularly important 
role was played by economists of the Stockholm School - eg Gunnar Myrdal and 
Bertil Ohlin.
This primacy on domestic factors in the forging of hegemony and Swedish 
neutrality notwithstanding, the Swedish Model was a part of the socio-political 
order of Pax Americana. Sweden's Grotian-legalist foreign policy (Moller, 1988), 
providing a synthesis of the Wilsonian-liberal and revisionist-socialist 
internationalism of the 1920s and the "realist" neutrality during World War II, 
was consistent with participation in for example the United Nations system and 




























































































the right to shape its own development, while nevertheless participating in the 
fora of this community. Furthermore, during the more radical phase of the New 
Deal in the 1930s, some prominent social democratic intellectuals such as the 
Myrdals even identified very strongly with the "rationalism" American welfare 
reform, which they contrasted with European developments (Myrdal and Myrdal, 
1943). Swedish social democrats identified with what Harvey (1990) describes to 
be the unambivalent modernity of Americanism, which contrasted with the 
ambivalence of inter-war Europe. The Swedish business community 
straightforwardly advocated an Anglo-Saxon, "social liberal" type of welfare 
provision, and belonged to the mainstream of the Atlantic corporate liberal 
nexus. In the early postwar period, the business community also successfully 
contained more dirigiste forms of industrial policy, advocated by the Social 
Democrats. They did so by successfully invoking Cold War metaphors against 
"planning" in the elections of 1946 and 1948 (Sainsbury, 1980). However, 
important in this context was also that the international boom, catalyzed by the 
Marshall Plan "empirically demonstrated" for social democrats that the existing 
state-market mix was adequate to ensure their aims (Lewin, 1967).
"Disarticulated Fordism" and the Rehn-Meidner Model
The Swedish postwar economy had important specific characteristics, that 
made it dependent on the world order. This applies both to its particular type of 
"disarticulated Fordist” structure and its "Kaleckian" mode of regulation, 
codified in the Rehn-Meidner model.
The somewhat counter-intuitive term "disarticulated Fordism" requires 
some elaboration.12 Fordist growth was autocentric, typically articulating mass 
production and mass consumption. Accumulation was stabilized ex ante through 




























































































systems. In this context, international trade may play an important but 
nevertheless auxiliary role in capital accumulation. Despite the progressive 
increase of international trade in the postwar period, capital accumulation 
conformed to the Fordist ideal type in the large industrialized countries. They 
developed differentiated industrial structures first behind the trade barriers of the 
immediate postwar period, and then maintained industrial diversity because 
increased trade was of an intra-industry as opposed to inter-industry nature 
(Mjoset et.al.. 1986: 70-71; Ruggie, 1983: 216-17, both cf. Cooper 1980). In 
addition, significant international connections were restricted to trade 
relationships. Productive and financial capital tended to be of a national 
character, up until the development of the "offshore” Euro-dollar markets in the 
late 1960s.'3
Sweden's postwar economy, however, diverged from this pattern as far as 
the relationship between capital accumulation and trade is concerned. Here, mass 
production was relatively undiversified, whereas mass consumption was 
diversified and the circuit of capital accumulation was very trade dependent. 
Mass production was dependent upon demand in the world economy, and mass 
consumption was dependent upon imports, financed by foreign exchange earned 
from high value added commodities in the export sector. The latter was 
composed by a few large firms, and had a narrow product composition (machine- 
tool manufacturing, semiprocessed raw materials such as steel, pulp, and later a 
handful of consumer durable firms emerged - Volvo and Elektrolux). This is not 
to say that internal mass consumption would not become important for domestic 
mass production. The success of Swedish corporations such as Tetra-Pak, IKEA, 
Electrolux, Ericsson, Asea, SAAB and Volvo in developing their products 
depended on the user-producer networks and demand induced by public domestic 




























































































telecommunications, nuclear power programmes, and housing provisions) and 
real wage increases (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993). However, the key to the 
viability of these firms has nevertheless been export performance, not directly 
domestic demand. Swedish mass production and consumption was mediated by 
the world market (Mjoset et.al.: pp.72-73, 76-89; 1987:410).
But Sweden achieved autocentric development despite this disarticulation 
of production and consumption. The product and process composition developed 
a high technological potential for productivity increases in relation to scale. 
Other factors and forms of policy routines than merely aggregate demand 
management, ensured autocentric accumulation. These included selective forms 
of labour market policy, coordination of economic policy and wage 
determination through corporatist arrangements, tight regulation of credit 
markets, and close to no foreign ownership and control over the means of 
production (J.O Andersson, 1990: 26-27; Ryner, 1996: 91-130). These 
crystallized into a "Kaleckian" mode of regulation, that hence not only was 
required from a legitimation perspective, but for disarticulated Fordist capital 
accumulation.
This synergy of accumulation and legitimation imperatives find their 
paradigmatic expression in the so called "Rehn-Meidner model", named after the 
institutionalist trade union economists, that were its author (LO, 1951). The 
highly centralized blue-collar union federation, LO, and the Social Democratic 
government, combined the abovementioned policy elements into a coherent 
paradigm for economic efficiency and social equity through this model. Rehn and 
Meidner departed from the premise that full employment and equal pay for equal 
work, irregardless of the capacity of the individual firm to pay - "solidaristic 
wage policy", were the central ends. Coordination of centralized wage bargaining 




























































































LO with the necessary clout in negotiations to exert its solidaristic wage policy, 
which disciplined Swedish capital to transform and innovate itself so it could 
afford to pay the centrally negotiated wages. Dynamic firms were awarded stable 
wage rates despite a tight labour market and powerful unions, but stagnant firms 
were forced out of business. This in turn released capital that could be invested in 
the dynamic sectors through the bank-centred credit system, and labour that was 
channeled to new sectors through labour market policy (especially retraining and 
moving grants).
The macroeconomic policy stance faced a dilemma here. On the one hand 
it had to be sufficiently expansionary to sustain full employment. But, on the 
other hand, it had to be restrictive enough to ensure a low profit to value added 
rates. If policy was too expansionary, excess demand would allow corporations 
to pass on labour-costs through inflationary price increases. This would 
depreciate the real value of work, retard structural transformation, and lead to 
wage-drift. The latter is voluntary payments over and above collective wage 
settlements to selective workers, which threatened to lead to distributive conflict 
between labour groups, and undermine the solidaristic principle. As a result, the 
Rehn-Meidner model prescribed a relatively restrictive macroeconomic policy 
stance, and instead argued for more selective policies of intervention, such as 
labour market policy, collective savings and investment funds, and low interest 
rates, to ensure adequate investment (see Martin, 1984).
When Korpi and Esping-Andersen discuss de-commodified distribution 
they tend to emphasize social policy based on citizenship entitlement. However, 
the Rehn-Meidner model was perhaps even more critical in facilitating de­
commodification. Its overall effect was reduced labour segmentation (Aberg, 
1984) and an attenuation of market criteria in wage formation (it attenuated the 




























































































Moreover, full employment and solidaristic wage distribution also prevented a 
fiscal overload on social policy programmes such as unemployment insurance. 
But the Rehn-Meidner model also made such distribution compatible with 
capitalist accumulation. Since solidaristic wage policy implied a relative 
restriction of wage increases in the more dynamic sectors of the economy and 
punished stagnant firms, it ensured that Sweden's export sector remained 
competitive. The Rehn-Meidner model operated as a Fordist mode of regulation, 
then, in the sense that it set wages according to the principle of ex ante 
integration, and it deliberately promoted productivity growth through 
technological innovation of the Taylorist labour process. But such innovation 
was not primarily ensured through an expansion of domestic aggregate demand. 
Rather, it was ensured through the "transformation pressure" the Rehn-Meidner 
model exerted on the Swedish economy (Erixon, 1994), and by the demand-pull 
of the international economy.
But as a consequence of the logic of the Rehn-Meidner model, Sweden's 
international dependence was not only due to its economic structure, but also 
because of its economic policy paradigm. Because of its emphasis on profits- 
squeeze and transformation pressure, Swedish macroeconomic policy depended 
on external aggregate demand expansion to ensure full employment. This was 
provided by the demand pull of an expanding international economy and the 
reconstruction of Europe, first bolstered by the Marshall Plan, and then by a 
progressive liberalization and expansion of trade (Olsson, 1993: 24-31). It is 
therefore not a contradiction that neutral, social democratic and corporatist 
Sweden has been an enthusiastic supporter of US-sponsored multilateral trade 
institutions such as the GATT and OEEC, and even has been a solid ally of 
Britain to an "inter-governmental", not "federalist", approach to European 




























































































But the "embedded" dimension of American hegemony, expressed in the 
regulation of international finance was also important to ensure other aspects of 
Swedish regulation. The "double screen" of the Bretton Woods system, with its 
fixed exchange rate regime and its encouragement of quantitative credit and 
foreign exchange controls, ensured the capacity to fine-tune countercyclical 
policy, which the Rehn-Meidner model demanded to make compatible full 
employment and the profit squeeze. Quantitative capital and exchange rate 
controls made it possible to pursue an active countercyclical budgetary and 
monetary policy, while keeping exchange rates constant and, above all, while 
keeping interest rates relatively stable and low. This, in turn, ensured a credible 
price anchor for collective bargaining, consistent with solidaristic wage policy. 
(Notermans, 1993; Ryner, 1996). First, low and stable interest rates and fixed 
exchange rates made it possible to set wages ex ante according to anticipated 
productivity and inflation developments. Second, low interest rates (together with 
a selective investment fund policy, tax policy, and the steering of pension fund 
savings to public housing construction also made it possible to ensure an 
adequate propensity to invest, despite the profit squeeze. Low interest rates also, 
of course, minimized distributive share to rentier capital, compared to productive 
capital and labour.14
Tripartite Forms of Representation and Regulation
I have described the socio-political basis of the Swedish Model and how it 
regulated the circuit of capital accumulation with due regard for legitimation. 
Most Gramscian and regulation theoretical accounts stop here (Jessop, 1990: 
307-19). But this, in my view, is to treat the actual procedural forms of regulation 
too unproblematically. Following Bob Jessop's reformulation of Poulantzian state 




























































































a complex ensemble of specialized agencies bestowed with certain authorities 
and functions. This complex ensemble is itself a contradictory unity whose 
internal regulation and cohesion need to be explained rather than presupposed. It 
is important to acknowledge the "autonomous" efficacy of these forms and their 
selective biases on outcomes. It is in the context of these procedural forms that 
social forces are politically defined, are included or excluded, raise demands or 
pursue policies, exercise power or are regulated. Political subjects tend to be 
prisoners of these procedures, that are crystallized in stable historic blocs. In the 
"formative events" of organic crises, subjects can also significantly shape them. 
But also then, the legacy of old forms of regulation tend to play a significant role.
The mode of regulation, which mediated the accumulation and 
legitimation imperatives discussed above, was encoded through a national 
tripartite (or democratic-corporatist) state. Tripartism, as a special variant of the 
capitalist state has a particular dual form of social representation (Jessop, 1979). 
Forces of civil society are here indirectly represented in two ways. Firstly, 
individual citizens (abstracted from social stratification (Poulantzas, 1978)) are 
represented through political parties in Parliament. Secondly, functional interest 
representation is granted to the peak organizations of labour and capital. The 
latter have been bestowed with direct representation in the policy process, in 
exchange for not pursuing their individual interests in a manner that disregards 
the socially constructed "general interest". The interest groups "assume social 
responsibility". Moreover, different branches of the formal legal state represent 
different social groups through their function in the policy process.
This definition of the institutional forms of tripartism is intended to clarify 
the nature of separation and connection between the mode of regulation of the 
state and civil society: Political discourse of civil society, and the power 




























































































state action. However, those constraints are channelled to the mode of regulation 
only through the available modes of representation. This creates a "relatively 
autonomous" space for policy making and policy discourse informed by, for 
example, economic theory. Autonomy implies that policy discourse is not 
identical in form and substance with the "national popular" discourse of civil 
society. Relativity of autonomy implies that policy outcomes cannot contradict 
the national popular discourse in the long run, without a crisis of legitimation. 
The forces of civil society can sanction "illegitimate" policy through the election 
process and the party system, as well as through sanctioning the peak 
associations of their interest groups. Capital can also sanction the policy process 
through capital flight. In instances of political crisis, social forces may also 
sanction policy through illegal means, such as wildcat strikes. At the same time, 
modes of regulation, and the state more generally, have been chief vessels 
through which a hegemonic power bloc is organized. The state contributes 
significantly towards the construction of the very identities of social subjects, as 
well as hegemonic social paradigms (Jenson, 1989: 236-40).
Representation in the tripartite state is unequal (Mahon, 1977: 170-74). 
The various state agencies are organized in a hierarchy of "contradictory unity" 
for the purpose of social, political and economic mediation. The agencies at the 
apex of the hierarchy serve a integrative function, and subsidiary agencies serve 
specialized functions. The relative degree of representation of social subjects 
depends upon the position of agencies within the hierarchy of the agencies to 
which they have access. Moreover, the degree and quality of representation 
depends upon the form  of access. The state does not reflect the special interests 
of any one group transparently. Rather, demands in a liberal democratic state 
must be articulated by state agencies in terms of a policy discourse concerned 




























































































agencies in a less mediated manner than other social forces, and therefore can 
more directly define the manner in which they are encoded in the state (their 
"power to name themselves" (Jenson, 1989), and the terms policy discourse and 
substance. The unequal structure of representation is therefore also a function of 
the form of access different social forces have to state agencies. In the capitalist 
state, the "general interest" of "managing the economy" serves primarily subjects 
of capital, because of the formal separation of politics and economics and their 
privileged position in the social relations of production. They exercise structural 
power. Marginalized social subjects have no or little representation in the state, 
but rather are viewed purely as objects of regulation. Insofar as the state 
socializes social subjects, all social subjects are to some extent objectified by the 
state. But some are less objectified than others, and through less repressive 
means.
On this theme, it should also be noted that, especially in corporatism, state 
regulation extends beyond the formal legal state into civil societal interest 
groups. This means that the power of members of interest organizations to name 
themselves, and their interests in their own organizations is compromised by the 
need to "take social responsibility" (Panitch, 1979). Officials in unions and 
employers' organization then have to delicately balance their role to legitimately 
representing their members and their role of social regulation, defined by 
corporatist agreements.
The interactive policy routines of wage determination, labour market 
policy, macroeconomic policy and general welfare policy constituted the core of 
the postwar Swedish mode of regulation. The discretionary private rights of 
private business in production and investment decisions, and the right of 
management to manage were ensured. However the environment in which capital 




























































































policy, and collective bargaining. As argued in the previous section, the 
"embedded" nature of the economic structure, as well as the national territorial 
fix of production and financial circuits (as opposed to trade circuits), were crucial 
in this regard.
The Ministry of Finance was located at the apex of this mode of 
regulation. Its ability to pursue an active macroeconomic policy was ensured 
through a stable party system, with the SAP as the "natural party of government". 
While the aims and instruments of the Rehn-Meidner model were not shared by 
other parties and groups outside SAP and LO, there was a common 
macroeconomic policy discourse, based on the theories of the "Stockholm 
School", that expanded beyond the party boundaries. Effective control over the 
Central Bank (Uusitalo, 1984; Notermans, 1993), and a "special relationship" in 
cabinet between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance (Rehn, 1977) 
were also crucial in ensuring the pivotal position of the Ministry of Finance.
In capitalist states it is typical that subjects associated with the dominant 
fractions of capital have privileged and more direct access to the Ministry of 
Finance. This was not the case in postwar Sweden. LO and the employers' 
federation (SAF) seem to have had indirect access on relatively equal terms. In 
tripartism, capital maintains a privileged position in terms of structural power 
(e.g Offe and Wiesenthal, 1985), but this was balanced by the fact that trade 
union officials participated in the formulation of policy through the channels of 
the Social Democratic party (Pontusson, 1992: ch.3; Amark, 1989), which is 
expressed by the fact that it actually was LO-economists that formulated the 
economic policy paradigm. But the inability - and unwillingness - of the Ministry 
of Finance to transparently represent labour is highlighted by the fact that they 
interpreted ambiguities in the the Rehn-Meidner model slightly differently (e.g 




























































































This tension between macroeconomic managers and unionists stem from 
their different perspectives of the relationship of wages to their policy ends. For 
macroeconomic managers, too high macro-wage levels may endanger balance of 
payments (through high relative unit labour costs). For unionists too low wage 
increases are of course a bad thing as such. But moreover, they may jeopardize 
"external wage levelling", and make it possible for individual entrepreneurs to 
offer market-determined extra wage increases (wage drift) that may undermine 
the "moral economy" (the socially constructed norms of relative wage relations), 
and threaten organizational unity and legitimacy within the labour movement. As 
a result, the Ministry of Finance tended to favor more general expansionary 
policies, higher profit rates, and "wage restraint" than the LO. The latter tended 
to argue for moderation on aggregate demand expansion and more emphasis on 
selective policies.
Other important agencies of social representation have been the Ministry 
of Social Affairs which was charge of the creation of an institutional welfare 
state, and the Labour Market Ministry and the tripartite Labour Market Board 
(AMS), in charge of implementing the selective labour market policy that the 
Rehn-Meidner model prescribed. These agencies provided intra-state channels 
of representation that constrained the Department of Finance. But at the same 
time, they were disciplined by the Department of Finance. The tensions I have in 
mind here are rather straightforward: Specialized ministries seek to maximize the 
resources to pursue their policy ends, and the Ministry of Finance tries to enforce 
a budget constraint. Cabinet meetings and the budget negotiation process 
constitute the main channels of communication between the agencies in question.
"Representation of labour" begs the question "which labour?". In the 
"golden-age" of the Swedish Model the answer was clearly the male provider of a 




























































































particular, narrow, interpretation of the central aspect of Social Democratic 
ideology. "Integral democracy and de-proletarianization" (Tilton, 1988) was 
interpreted in terms of full employment, rising real wages, basic income and 
welfare entitlement security, indirect representation through the liberal 
democratic state, and through trade unions. More participatory understandings of 
these terms, such as industrial democracy were peripheralized, or were abstracted 
to some promise for the future. Questions concerning patriarchy and the sexual 
division of labour were not acknowledged as questions pertaining to unequal 
power relations and social inequality. Thus the nuclear family, with its 
hierarchical social relations, would serve a crucial role in the social structure of 
accumulation, in which the Taylorist worker would be reproduced. This notion 
was reflected in the types of incomes support, and housing policies promoted by 
the welfare state. The point is not that these programmes were not comparatively 
generous (they were), but rather that they assigned women as domestic workers a 
subordinate role, and served to socialize a particular conception of gender 
relations without meaningful input from subjects representing the socially 
subordinate gender, women (Hirdman, 1992; Jenson & Mahon, 1993). Moreover, 
the hegemonic discourse did exclude questions on the environmental effects of 
mass production/consumption, and the implications on low-growth regions of 
economic "rationalization".
Nevertheless, it was possible to contain the potential tensions within this 
complex of state-society relations during the postwar "golden age". High demand 
for Swedish exports contained the potentially competing objectives of large real 
wage increases and union unity, and a rapid expansion of the universalist welfare 
state on the one hand, and the maintenance of cost competitiveness and full 
employment on the other. Thus, relatively harmonious working conditions were 




























































































charge of respective functions (LO, and the Social Democratic state managers 
and personnel located in, respectively, the Labour Market Ministry, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Finance). Peaceful industrial relations between 
business and labour were facilitated. Moreover, subordinate groups and identities 
were either marginalized, or were successfully integrated within the expanding 
welfare and consumer-society. Consequently, the welfare state could be 





























































































The Swedish crisis has unfolded synchronously with world order 
developments, but with its distinct dynamics. Social antagonisms generated by 
the contradictions of Fordism initially triggered the crisis, which began as a crisis 
of representation and legitimation in the late 1960s. Further social reforms were 
implemented to address this crisis. But they could not be rendered compatible 
with changing economic conditions, and the crisis became one of capital 
accumulation in the mid-1970s. Social reforms provoked a counter-mobilization 
on the right, and a hyper-liberal project has been advanced under the leadership 
of SAF since this time. Though this project has failed to supplant the "common 
sense" of social democratic hegemony altogether, it has mobilized a sizable part 
of the middle class. More importantly, SAF has rendered tripartite regulation 
inoperative, simply by exiting from its fora. Its capacity to successfully do so 
reflects the increased structural power of Swedish capital, which resulted from a 
process of market driven economic restructuring in the 1980s. This process was 
facilitated by a social democratic economic policy that, in the context of this 
"blue wave" became increasingly informed by compensatory liberalism. 
Economic restructuring in the 1980s ensured short term stability and a revival of 
export-competitiveness. However, there was no resolution of the deeper 
problems of accumulation and a crisis of labour representation and legitimation 
re-emerged. The crisis has been amplified in the 1990s. Economic imbalances 
re-emerged with a vengeance in the recession 1991-93. In addition, neo­
liberalism in all its variants has been discredited in popular discourse, and cannot 
mobilize sufficient popular appeal to stabilize regulation. But the increased 
structural power of capital and business strategy makes it much more difficult to 
pursue alternative accumulation strategies. Sweden's present situation is 




























































































The 1970s: Social Protest, Reform and Stagnation
The first phase of the crisis was catalyzed by the radicalization wave 
triggered by the Vietnam War. Two characteristics of Fordist development were 
particularly important in defining the habitus of this phase: the generalization of 
the wage relation and the rationalization of the labour process. But a 
radicalization of discourse in media and civil society served to generalize the 
political significance local antagonisms, and this generated a crisis of labour 
representation (Schiller, 1988) The critical turning point was a wildcat-strike 
wave in 1969. The main causes of the strike was alienation in the workplace, 
uneven wage increases, a perception of excess profits in expanding firms where 
workers did not get their "fair share", and uneven regional development 
(Simonson, 1988; Swenson, 1989). The question of uneven wage distribution 
was exacerbated by a fragmentation in the wage-determination regime, and this 
also made solutions difficult to achieve within the institutional boundaries .
White collar workers were not organized by the LO, but by separate, looser 
organized confederations (TCO and SACO), and they did not accept the principle 
of solidaristic wage policy. This mattered little for overall economic regulation in 
the 1940s and 1950s. But the Taylorist separation of conception and execution, 
and welfare state expansion, led to growth in the relative size of the white collar 
strata (the "service economy"). Apart from fragmenting bargaining into separate 
blue and white-collar "rounds", this also implied a procedural separation of wage 
bargaining in the export oriented- and domestic (welfare) sectors (Martin, 1984; 
Fulcher, 1991). The quantitative expansion of salaried employment rendered 
more serious a long-standing conflict between the LO collective and TCO and 
SACO. But the expansion of the welfare state made the situation even more 




























































































women who were recruited to part-time service jobs (Baude, 1979).
In effect, welfare state expansion implied a partial transformation of 
reproductive relations from an "informal" patriarchical family mode to a bipartite 
labour mode (Cox, 1987: ch. 1). In this context, the TCO unions that were 
organizing women became a faction that pushed for solidaristic wage policy. But 
moreover women's groups demanded further welfare reforms to ease the "double 
burden" of wage- and family work. They, as well as the blue collar rank and file 
militants, began to challenge the terms of the old Model by pointing to its 
inadequacy in relation to its own high aims of social equality, inclusion and 
democracy (Jenson and Mahon, 1993).
These developments made it increasingly difficult for the existing tripartite 
structures to adequately represent labour, because they were becoming 
inadequate in reproducing the moral economy as understood by workers. In part 
this was because the meaning of the moral economy was being redefined to 
include gender equality, industrial democracy, and regional economic balance. 
But in part it because because of the difficulties of coordinating bargaining that 
now was fragmented into three major bargaining rounds, which was in contrast to 
the situation in the 1950s and early 1960s, when LO's and SAFs chief 
negotiators effectively could set the macroeconomically relevant wage norms for 
the entire economy. These development also put a strain on the capacity of the 
tripartite structure to ensure the competitiveness of the Swedish export sector in 
the context of the fixed exchange rate system, since leap-frog bargaining 
increased inflationary pressure.
A number of initiatives were made in the tripartite context to respond to 
these challenges. SAF took the initiative to formalize the economic parameters of 
wage-bargaining between the export- and domestic sectors, and invited TCO and 




























































































formulated by economists of the three organizations (Martin, 1984). The unions 
responded to the grievances of the rank and file by lobbying for legislation on the 
work-environment and codetermination, as well as collective capital formation. 
Thereby they hoped to combine shopfloor participation with continued 
centralized solidaristic wage bargaining (Ibid; Simonson, 1988). Finally, the 
Social Democratic party, but also Liberals and Agrarians, pushed for further 
expansion of social services and benefits and regional development (Olsson, 
1987).
The early 1970s was a period of extended reforms. This reflected the 
conditional manner in which Swedish society had been interpellated into the 
Fordist compromise. When the crisis undermined the latter, the specific terms of 
the Swedish compromise led to a rather radical leftist response. The ideology of 
the hegemonic party was open to, and even invited, such a response with its 
doctrine of a gradual socialist transformation. Prime Minister Tage Erlander tried 
to champion the radicalization of discourse. He talked of the "development of 
rising expectations" as something to be mobilized. Indeed, he argued that it was 
this that set social democrats apart from welfare liberals and their "end of 
ideology" thesis (Erlander, 1979; 1982). During this period, more resources were 
allocated to regional support and labour market policy. Industrial policy 
measures were taken, which included the creation of a state investment bank and 
increased leeway for pension funds to invest in equity (the 4th AP-fund). Parental 
insurance and daycare programmes were implemented. Finance for these 
measures were primarily raised by compulsory employers' contributions. LO’s 
call for industrial democracy were heeded with a Codetermination Act (MBL), a 
Work Environment Act and Legislation of Employment Protection (LAS). 
Finally, a Public Commission on wage earner funds was set up. And in 1976, LO 




























































































less but started a gradual process of socialization of Swedish capital. 
Internationally, it is in this period that Sweden's foreign policy stance becomes 
increasingly "idealist", for example with regards to the NIEO. the Vietnam War, 
and disarmament.
This wave of welfare reform, and the attempts to "bridge" what we 
retrospectively know as stagflation in 1974 and 1977 with fiscal expansion, have 
subsequently been blamed for Sweden's economic crisis. In particular the blame 
is laid at the feet of short-sighted "special interests" (read the unions) (Lindbeck 
et.al. 1994). I would like to challenge this prevailing neo-liberal thesis, which I 
think is damaging because it fallaciously dismisses the functional feasibility of 
these reforms in a radical "state capitalist" (pace Cox, 1987) direction. I do not 
think they can be ruled out as an ipso facto dysfunctional response to the Fordist 
crisis. This is not without significance if one is looking for egalitarian, and 
developmental-democratic alternatives to neoliberal post-Fordism.
It is especially important to note that, contrary to the neo-liberal thesis, 
there is no convincing evidence that allocative inefficiencies ("sclerosis") are at 
the root of the crisis. There is no evidence that "market distortions" have caused 
productivity decline (Sweden.SOU, 1991: 7-144; Wibe, 1993). Moreover there is 
no evidence of rigid wage formation and inhibiting workplace organization 
causing a poor allocative performance of the Swedish labour market. Indeed, 
studies, using a variety of indicators and methods, have continuously shown that 
Sweden's labour market allocates labour comparatively well (eg. Boswoth and 
Rivlin, 1987; Aberg, 1987; 76-84; Standing, 1988; OECD, 1989: 55-80; 
Holmlund, 1993). When confronted with, at best, ambiguities in their evidence, 
neoliberal economists tend to violate their method and make their case through 
an interpretative invokation the need for "flexibility" in the era of post-Fordism 




























































































economy, such implicit acknowledgements of the hermeneutic dimension of 
social science should perhaps be welcomed. But theirs are models that lack 
ontological depth and complexity. It is important to distinguish between different 
forms of flexibility, and in post-Fordism, micro-wage flexibility is not the most 
important form of flexibility, nor arguably even desirable. Functional flexibility, 
reskilling and a cooperative environment for technological diffusion is important, 
and here one of the legacies of the 1970s-reforms - codetermination - proved 
itself as a promising post-Fordist institutional form in the 1980s (Aberg, 1988; 
Standing, 1988: 126-47; Sandberg et.al. 1992; Sandberg, 1994).
Nevertheless, after the reform wave of the 1970s followed a crisis of 
capital accumulation, and while the 1970s reforms did not cause this, the 
economic crisis did mean that the reforms could not be adequately underwritten 
by export earnings. This, together with the fiscal policies of 1974 and 1977 that 
indeed were too expansionary, contributed to a derivative fiscal crisis.16 
Underdetermining all this was an exceptionally severe loss of competitiveness in 
1976 resulting from Sweden's particular form of Fordism. After having benefitted 
from the 1974/75 raw-materials boom, the stagflation crisis hit Sweden. It was 
enforced by the fact that Sweden's "narrow" export sector was disproportionally 
composed of firms producing in a late phase of the product cycle and in special 
steels, that became "price takers" rather than "price makers" (Erixon, 1984: 115- 
16, 123-24). The combination of factors had a devastating impact on profitability 
and the capacity to realize invested capital.
A significant international development was the collapse of Bretton 
Woods. As explained above, the Swedish Model could not generate sufficient 
aggregate demand for its full employment policies, but relied on the demand pull 
of the world economy. When this demand pull abated as other Western states 




























































































was hit by structural shocks, Swedish policy makers then nevertheless tried to 
"bridge" the shortfall through aggregate demand expansion. But this fragmented 
the domestic collective bargaining regime further, as it led to wage drift and leap­
frog bargaining (Martin, 1984). Matters were exacerbated by the breakdown of 
the fixed exchange rate regime. Sweden initially joined the European monetary 
snake to retain a stable framework for economic policy, but withdrew in 1977 
when the full employment commitment could not be rendered consistent with 
Bundesbank-led monetary policy (Sweden.Ministry of Economics, 1977). Since 
that time the Swedish currency was devalued at frequent intervals to compensate 
for the comparatively high price increases, that resulted from trying to keep 
unemployment lower than trade competitors. This might have seemed like a 
reasonable "tradeoff', but it further eroded the collective bargaining regime: 
During Bretton Woods stable exchange rates and low and stable interest rates 
kept the variables to consider in bargaining simple. Inflation could essentially be 
deduced from production cost increases. Since 1977, however, bargaining also 
had to factor in currency depreciation and other inflationary expectation. This, 
together with expansionary policies and internal fragmentation, rendered the 
effects of bargaining even more uncertain and inflationary. It must be 
underlined that these developments cannot be blamed on the Rehn-Meidner 
model. If anything, without the attempts to pursue coordinated and solidaristic 
wage policy, things would have been worse (Erixon, 1984). However, the 
abovementioned factors served to undermine its capacity to integrate 
accumulation, distribution, representation and legitimation imperatives. It is also 
not so that trade unionists were all short sighted in this context. LO's researchers 
and leaders were acutely aware of the need to further strengthen the institutions 
linking distribution with macroeconomic stability and growth, and they used their 




























































































the need to provide measures to increase savings and investments, in order to 
meet the day when the international boom would abate (Martin, 1984 cf LO, 
1961). LO-economists were also keenly aware that the increased social 
consumption generated by the 1970s reforms had to be combined with increased 
capital formation, to ensure adequate levels of savings, investment, and 
production in Sweden. Quite correctly, they doubted the propensity of private 
capital to continue to play this role (eg. LO, 1971). But the measures intended to 
serve an integrative function between accumulation and expanded social 
consumption in the 1970s reforms were never implemented as a coherent strategy 
for capital formation- and industrial policy (Pontusson, 1992).17 One cannot 
know whether such a capital formation strategy would have been successful on a 
large scale if properly implemented and tried. At the same time, subsequent facts 
cannot be taken as evidence that the radical social democratic strategy envisaged 
in the 1970s was economically unfeasible, because it was never tried. What can 
be said is that the partially implemented reforms were unfeasible in the context of 
Fordist crisis. They emphasized only the social consumption-side, and did not 
address the attendant need for a radically reformed mode of regulation, capable to 
mediate consumption with capital accumulation.
Why did a coherent economic strategy not materialize? Politics internal to 
the social democratic movement provides a part of the answer. LO and SAP, 
never seriously attempted to build a hegemonic project around collective capital 
formation, which was required because it actually did imply a violation of the 
terms of the postwar compromise. Capital formation politics was popular in the 
immediate blue collar ranks, but LO never managed to convince the rest of the 
social democratic movement that it was worth the electoral risks to mobilize 
around the issue. In particular, they failed to develop an alliance with cadres in 




























































































the 1970s that there was a problem of capital accumulation. This isolated LO in 
their dealings with the macroeconomic managers in the Ministry of Finance, who 
represented the SAP in deliberations concerning capital formation politics. 
Though they were not always outright hostile to collective capital formation, they 
were much more cautious and skeptical - and also more optimistic about the 
prospects of resolving economic difficulties through incomes policies (Ryner, 
1996: ch.6). This is also the route social democrats would choose in the 1980s.
The 1980s: Neoliberalism. Restructuring, and Impasse
One should not underestimate the sense of weakness in business circles 
during the height of the "red wave". After LO endorsed the Meidner Plan, SAF 
actually prepared a counter-proposal for collective capital formation - the so 
called "Waldenstrom Report" - whose funds would have been much more potent 
than the midget version that, despite everything, was passed in 1983. A more 
strategically coherent labour politics might have taken better advantage of this. 
But instead, the political and economic pressures on Swedish capital - the profit 
squeeze, increased employers' contributions to finance social consumption, 
juridification of the labour process, and an outright challenge to private 
ownership of the means of production - triggered a change in the ideological and 
strategic orientation of SAF. Behind this change lay a shift in the internal balance 
of power. Small entrepreneurs had long had grievances against the policies of 
tripartite accommodation. Their increased activism, as well as SAF's setbacks in 
the 1970s, also politicized the SE-Bank/Wallenberg sphere. This sphere had only 
reluctantly conditioned themselves to the "historic compromise". But henceforth 
it took on a leadership role within SAF at the expense of the Handelsbank sphere, 
within which one finds those on the business side that actively supported the 




























































































representation of entrepreneurs, and less discretionary autonomy of SAF 
functionaries (Schiller, 1987: 124-28, 135-38; De Geer, 1989;Ryner. 1996).
A turning point for SAF was the appointment of Asea's Curt Nicolin as 
Executive Director in 1978. This appointment has been described as a "culture 
shock" by senior officials of the organization (Schiller, 1987: 137-38; 
Ehrencrona, 1991: 257). Since then, SAF's orientation has become increasingly 
hyper-liberal. SAF assumed a position of total non-accommodation in the Public 
Commission responsible to iron out a compromise on wage earner funds, and the 
Waldenstom Report was shelved. Attempts to overcome differences with LO on 
wage levels and the status of "collective savings" in the EFO-model were 
abandoned, as was a centralist bargaining strategy in general. The new premise 
was that it was more beneficial to exit than to have a voice in corporatist forms of 
bargaining. By January 1992 SAF had unilaterally exited from all such 
arrangements (SAF, 1991: 9-18; 147-65). In terms of the framework outlined in 
the previous section, this can be understood as a demand for a less mediated form 
of representation (Ahme and Clement, 1994), and less state autonomy in relation 
to the structural power of capital. This is also reflected in the abovementioned 
changes within SAF itself, which is notably expressed in the abolition of its 
Central Bargaining Directorate.
In addition, at this point SAF began to assume the role of an aspiring 
"hegemonic party" (Clement, 1992), attempting to shape intellectual and popular 
discourse and the terrain of contestability in civil society in a market friendly 
direction (Schiller, 1987: 46-47; 148-49). Although this strategy has fallen short 
of realizing a Thatcherite national-popular hegemony in Sweden, it has 
nevertheless been quite a success. It ensured the defeat of wage earner funds in 
the electoral arena. More broadly, it has made neoliberal ideas popular in the 




























































































conservative party) and the rightward shift of the Liberals on economic issues. 
The subsequent shift in the substance of economic discourse in Sweden also took 
place in the context of strategic business funding of economic research (see 
Grassman, 1985)
The hyperliberal turn of SAF marked the beginning of a third phase of 
crisis. But apart from this, there were also decisively important changes in the 
social democratic movement. There was a "retreat" from radical capital formation 
policy (Pontusson, 1987). But more importantly, social democratic 
macroeconomic managers began to pursue an economic policy informed by 
compensatory neo-liberalism. The economic policy of the Social Democrats 
1982-1990 was coined "the third way” (between Thatcherism and the 
Keynesianism). It was initially construed as a return to traditional Social 
Democratic politics, after the radical wave of the 1970s (H. Bergstrom, 1987; 
Amark, 1988). The structural and profitability crisis of the export sector, the 
external and budget deficits and debt, and the lack of productive investments, 
would be addressed through a one off devaluation, combined with a tight fiscal 
and domestic monetary policy, active labour market policy and an implicit 
incomes policy. The intention was to create an export led recovery and economic 
regeneration, and a substitution-effect that favoured private investment in the 
export sector over public and private consumption. Together with a moderately 
restrictive fiscal policy, this was meant to increase total tax revenues and stabilize 
the economy while ensuring full employment and the existing levels of social 
benefits and services. The strategy presupposed selective labour market policy 
measures and that a coordinated restraint in collective bargaining would be 
sufficient measure to contain unemployment and inflation (Ryner, 1994). Despite 
all the difficulties to achieve the latter, given the fragmentation in the collective 




























































































success. TCO had converted to the solidaristic wage policy principle, and this 
increased the chances of joint coordination with LO to contain leap frog 
bargaining. Thus, conditions that might have resurrected a coherent bargaining 
regime were not absent (Ahlen, 1989).
Helped along by the "Reagan boom", the strategy was initially remarkably 
successful in meeting its aims of competitiveness, profitability, investments, 
macroeconomic stability and full employment.18 However, the policy ultimately 
faltered because of the long term GDP- and productivity growth were not 
realized, and the implicit incomes policy failed . A basic fallacy of the policy was 
the premise that increased private profits and investments would regenerate GDP 
and productivity growth. Despite increased profits, investments and paradigmatic 
labour process innovation in some enterprises, a dynamic "post-Fordist" growth 
and productivity trajectory was not realized, but these growth rates remained on 
the levels of the late 1970s {Ibid. 396). Apart from the success of 
pharmaceuticals, there was little growth in new dynamic sectors and enterprises . 
Instead the strategy benefitted existing firms, which had a "golden decade" 
despite the lacldusture performance of Sweden's economy (Erixon, 1989). These 
firms disproportionally located high value added activities in continental 
Europe.19 Apart from precluding domestic growth rates, this also led to large 
deficits on the capital account. This was either done for the "defensive" purposes 
of buying up competitors to ensure a price-making privilege (Ibid). Or, foreign 
direct investments were part of an "offensive" strategy where the purpose was to 
achieve customer- and market proximity (Bergholm and Jagren, 1985; T. 
Andersson, 1993), which is consistent with post-Fordist "just-in-time"- 
production.
This can be interpreted as a change in the territorial fix of productive 




























































































productivity growth, and thereby further undermined the conditions presupposed 
by the Rehn-Meidner model. Most importantly, this form of post-Fordist 
restructuring has resulted in a relative peripheralization of the Swedish economy, 
as "its" multinationals reorganize themselves on a continental scale. It also 
produces a territorial non-correspondence between capital accumulation and state 
regulation. The structural power of capital is thereby increased, which supports 
SAFs new hyperliberal strategy. Alongside this "continentalization” goes a 
hyper-liberal post-Fordist strategy in labour process restructuring and wage 
bargaining. In the 1980s SAF began to pursue a "dualistic approach", arguing for 
micro-wage flexibility as a corporate instrument for management in the 
individual firms (Pontusson and Swenson, 1993; Mahon, 1994). Companies have 
become increasingly interested in creating a skilled, loyal, core work force, and a 
cheaper peripheral work force for low-end jobs. This corporate strategy 
reinforced SAFs reluctance to participate in tripartite arrangements, as did the 
increasingly transnational mode of operations, which implied that firms became 
less sensitive to Swedish macroeconomic instability (Erixon, 1984). A final 
factor in this context is the increased relative importance of the stock-market, 
rather than banks in Swedish finance, which has led to a relative breakdown in 
the cohesion of capital spheres. In part this is an effect of internationalization of 
production and finance, but it was also encouraged by financial deregulation, 
further discussed below.20
It should be noted that the nature of economic restructuring promoted by 
this economic policy contradicted the implicit incomes policy, which was one of 
its central instruments. The mode of restructuring reinforced the incentives and 
capacities of capital to exit tripartite arrangements. Moreover, on the union side, 
combinations of higher rate of profits, and a lack of productivity growth, made it 




























































































potential to bridge the LO-TCO divide implied in TCOs endorsement of 
solidaristic wage policy. As a result bargaining could not be adequately 
coordinated, and most certainly could not meet wage-cost targets set by the 
Ministry of Finance. Tight labour markets and high profits, combined with public 
fiscal moderation generated wage drift, uneven wage developments, and 
subsequent demands for leap-frog compensation. This undermined union 
cohesion and contributed to SAF's success in decentralizing bargaining. Workers 
do not join unions to have them demand less than employers are willing to pay, 
or to have them refrain from defending their members' relative or absolute real 
wages. White collar unions of professionals in the private sector were 
encouraged by employers to separate bargaining through various fringe benefits, 
profit-sharing schemes, and bonuses. And other unions were tempted to use the 
organizational clout an 80 percent union-density gave them to enforce 
compensation (see Elvander, 1988; Ahlen, 1989). Against this backdrop the 
contradictions between the unions' aim to reproduce a moral economy and the 
government’s incomes policy generated conflicts between LO/TCO and the 
Ministry of Finance.
It is tempting to explain the failure of the "third way" with reference to the 
abovementioned economic-structural transformations and the expansionary 
effects of the devaluation. I certainly do not want to underestimate the 
importance of these factors. They are necessary parts of the explanation. But a 
structural explanation can only be sufficient if one somehow can show that an 
optimal strategy was pursued, given these structural constraints. I would contend 
that this is not the case, and therefore, also changes of agency and ideology 
within social democracy itself must enter into the explanation. A set of policy 
moves in 1985 are central to the explanation behind the severity of the crisis 




























































































democratic economic state managers.
The government deregulated capital and money markets in 1985, and this 
was followed up by a formal deregulation of foreign exchange markets in 1989 
(that by then in large measure was de facto deregulated anyway). Moreover, the 
strategy in managing the public debt changed. Together with a vow not to 
devalue again,21 the government declared it would no longer borrow abroad 
directly to finance the debt or cover balance of payments deficits, but would 
rather only borrow on the domestic market (i.e only issue bonds in Swedish 
crowns). This meant that in order to maintain balance of payments, the Swedish 
interest rate would have to increase to a level where private agents would hold 
bonds or other debt in Swedish crowns, despite the devaluation risk (Bergstrom, 
1993: 159-60). The broader purpose of this so called "norms based" monetary 
policy, was to contain inflation by exerting market discipline on collective actors, 
such as unions and social service agencies in wage- and budget bargaining 
(Sweden.Ministry of Finance, 1985; Homgren, 1993). In other words, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank deliberately sought to amplify the 
territorial non-correspondence between global financial markets and collective- 
and state bargaining, for disciplinary purposes. This is a variant of "new 
constitutionalism".
This can only be described as an attempt to redefine the terms of social 
regulation and representation in the tripartite state. In effect, the Ministry of 
Finance abandoned its support of solidaristic wage policy, since the effects of 
market forces on interest and profit rates which conditioned wage bargaining 
were to be maximized rather than minimized. The tendencies towards deeper 
commodification of the wage relation were thus enforced. As a result, the 
conflict between LO and TCO and the Ministry of Finance assumed an entirely 




























































































government in 1982 were of the kind that emanated from ambiguities in the 
Rehn-Meidner. The conflict was no longer in regulation, but of regulation. LO 
and TCO did not consent to their marginalization, continued to demand support 
for solidaristic wage policy, and did not heed the "moral suasion" of incomes 
policy since there no longer were a coherent common moral framework.
An economic report written by LO's immediately after the deregulation 
indicates this (LO, 1986). It objected to the conjunctural effects of the 
deregulation of the capital markets: Since deregulation took place in what in 
1985 had become a booming economy, they argued that private borrowing would 
increase the velocity of money and overheating would ensue. This would lead to 
severe inflationary pressures, and it would be impossible for the LO to restrict 
compensatory nominal wage demands. But more importantly, the LO-economists 
argued, deregulation of the financial markets and the new borrowing policy of 
the state necessarily implied that when the government subsequently would be 
forced to cool the economy, it could only do so at the expense of union members. 
Either a state sanctioned wage freeze, or an abandonment of the full employment 
commitment would be required. Interest rate increases would also increase the 
demand for high profits, and further undermine the prospects for solidaristic 
wage policy. Hence, LO argued, not only would deregulation lead to a wage- 
drift generating overheated economy, it also divested the government of all 
stabilizing instruments, except instruments designed to exert labour discipline.
It should be noted that these policy changes were not subjected to debate 
and approval in any party congresses or in the electoral arena. Only the Central 
Bank and the Ministry of Finance were effectively involved. It even seems that 
the Prime Minister was excluded, or excluded himself from the process. In his 
memoirs, then Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt writes that when he pressed 




























































































deregulation, Palme's body language becames increasingly reluctant and hostile, 
and as Feldt thought Palme would veto the whole operation, the latter snapped: 
"You go ahead, 1 do not understand anything of that anyway!" (Feldt, 1991: 282). 
This uncharacteristic statement of a politician known for his charisma and self- 
assured intellect, speaks volumes on how monetary policy has become the 
exclusive arena of macroeconomic managers. Concurrently, just as these policies 
were implemented, the "third way" was still presented as a reformist socialist 
response to the crisis in opposition to neoliberalism (Palme, 1985). As a result 
the effects of the policy did not only generate difficulties with regards to labour 
representation, they could not be legitimated "ethico-politically" in the social 
democratic movement, nor in the electoral arena.22 It led to what has become 
known as the "War of the Roses" between the Ministry of Finance and the unions 
and social service cadres. The structural power mobilized by this form of rule has 
been effectively used to create a "crisis consciousness" at strategic junctures. 
Previously inconceivable decisions "to calm the market" have been taken in the 
context of rapid capital flight, including the decision to apply to the EC and to 
formally abandon the full employment commitment in 1990. But the lack of 
consent, as well as further economic overheating, implied that fragmentation in 
bargaining and wage push inflation was amplified rather than mitigated. 
Moreover, it was in the context of the "extraordinary measures" of a wage freeze 
and a temporary ban on strikes (that did not pass Parliament) that the electoral 
support of the SAP plummeted to a historical low, ultimately leading to a 
humiliating electoral defeat in 1991 (Ryner, 1994).
While sluggish economic growth and wage push inflation would have 
been the result anyway, it was this credit and monetary policy, as well as an 
under-financed tax reform in 1990 that accounts for the severe imbalances and 




























































































money velocity did overheat the economy. Moreover a massive credit bubble 
developed, due to speculation in real estate. When the recession of 1991 lowered 
real estate values and led to loan defaults, this led to a virtual meltdown of the 
Swedish banking system. The banking system as a whole only survived through a 
transfusion of liquidity from the state that dwarfed most social expenditure 
programs in its magnitude. The recession also led to sharp increases of 
unemployment insurance expenditure as unemployment went from 2 to 8 percent, 
and revenue shortfalls, resulting from the tax reform and the economic 
slowdown. These were further exacerbated by Carl Bildt's Conservative 
government's commitment to tax cuts.23 Against this backdrop, there was a heavy 
speculation on the Swedish crown in the end of 1992, which forced the short 
term marginal rate up to 500%, before the government had to give up and float 
the crown, which subsequently fell sharply in value. Interest rate increases and 
currency depreciation further exacerbated the fiscal crisis. The debt increased 
from comparatively low 45 percent in 1989 to approaching 100 percent of GDP 
in 1994 (OECD, 1994).
The increased exposure of Swedish debt to short term markets did not 
stabilize the economy, nor collective bargaining. But this did not mean that they 
were inconsequential in neoliberal restructuring. The so-called "crisis-packages", 
mentioned in the introduction, cutting back on welfare universalism have been in 
direct response to runs on the Swedish Crown (S.E. Olsson, 1993: 358-65).24
One cannot but conclude that capital deregulation and the strategy to 
increase Sweden's interest rate sensitivity seriously backfired. The basic fallacy 
was that such a constitutionalist form of regulation would enhance incomes 
policy. But short-termism and speculative nature of the international financial 
flows totally undermined any predictability for bargaining. Moreover, it is quite 




























































































stabilize bargaining by so blatantly violating the conditions LO require for wage 
coordination. One is tempted to suggest that the action social democratic 
macroeconomic managers expressed a "false consciousness" in this regard (with 
reference to the Rehn-Meidner model). What were the reasons behind the 
change of monetary policy? The immediate reasons behind capital market 
deregulation can be explained in terms of the cumulative erosion of the mode of 
regulation in the 1970s. Enduring inflation combined with low interest rates 
eroded the institutional capacity of the Central Bank to ration credit and control 
the money supply. Excess demand for debt was generated that could not be 
contained. A "grey" non-bank credit market of "finance houses" emerged and 
grew through the late seventies and the early eighties outside the framework of 
bank regulation. Initially the Central Bank attempted to respond through an 
extension of credit-rationing regulation. But further financial innovation rendered 
such regulation ineffective, and generated pressure from the powerful established 
banks for deregulation. When quantitative controls were abandoned, 
internationally determined interest rates, enforcing a discipline through the 
balance of payments constraint, was seen by the Central Bank as the only 
effective means to control inflation (Notermans 1993: 142-43, 145-46).
It should be noted, then, that there is a direct link between the failure to 
reform the mode of regulation in the 1970s, which led to inflation, and capital 
market deregulation. But this is not a sufficient explanation of the factors behind 
the monetary policy pursued. An alternative strategy to prevent inflation, favored 
by LO, would have been a more modest devaluation and/or to increased 
collective savings and investments, for example investment funds financed 
through "excess profit" taxes (such funds would have resembled 4th AP-fund, the 
Waldenstrom Report or joint LO/SAP wage earner fund proposal of 1981). One 




























































































that deregulation was synonymous with increased allocative efficiency of the 
credit market (Eg. Sweden.Ministry of Finance, 1984/85; 1985/86). This 
indicates a subjectively contingent neo-liberal social purpose. Such a social 
purpose is also indicated by the utilitarian reasoning behind the borrowing 
strategy (Homgren, 1993; Sweden.Ministry of Finance, 1985), which in sharp 
contrast to the Rehn-Meidner model, fallaciously assumed that market norms 
would stabilize wage bargaining. This policy selectivity and forgetting of basic 
elements of the Rehn-Meidner model, then, only makes sense with reference to 
the increased appeal of neo-liberal economic discourse among social democratic 
state managers in the Ministry of Finance. But why do social democratic 
macroeconomic managers become compensatory neo-liberals?
Can one explain this ideological development with reference to 
participation in
in the type transnational élite fora discussed in part one? Their relevance should 
not be dismissed, Swedish Central Bank and Finance Ministry officials 
participate congenially in the BIS, OECD, and the IMF. But while, the global 
dimension is crucial to understand the neo-constitutionalist form o f rule of the 
norms based policy, the causes to social democratic neoliberalism are not 
primarily found in transnational fora. While appreciating the exchange of 
experiences and ideas on technical implementation, these fora confirmed rather 
than transformed perspectives formulated on the domestic arena (Ryner, 1996; 
257-59). Hence no transnational convincing was necessary, state managers were 
already open to these types of ideas. Another explanation stresses the role of 
business sponsored think tanks in spreading neoclassical economic policy advice 
(eg Bergstrom, 1993). But, again, the problem with such explanations are that 
they do not account for why social democrats become receptive to neoliberal 




























































































more complex historical discourse analysis.
It is my thesis that this receptiveness is due to transformations in the 
epistemic form  - that is that what determines what is a "serious statement" 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982 cf Foucault, 1970) and sets the boundaries of 
contestability - of policy discourse. This epistemic form changed among social 
democratic state managers through the postwar period, and it is an effect of a 
diachronic logic within the institutional forms of the Swedish Model itself (see 
Ryner, 1996: ch. 7 for a fuller elaboration).
First it is important to note that there is an elective affinity between the 
substantive recommendation in the Rehn-Meidner model for a restrictive 
macroeconomic policy and monetarism. This is an important bridge from one 
discourse to the other. Indeed, the policy makers in question insist that their 
policy signified a return to traditional restrictive social democratic policy after 
the 1970s (Sweden.Ministry of Finance 1984/85). But clearly, a restrictive policy 
for the purpose of containing wage drift and ensuring a profit squeeze for 
solidaristic wage policy is quite different from one that emphasizes market 
determined interest rate discipline. How does one explain this shift from a 
"Kaleckian" institutionalist-strategic to a neoclassical-utilitarian discourse?
The first phase of the shift is the breakdown of the reformist-Marxian- 
Institutionalist synthesis on "organized capitalism" that originally interpellated 
social democrats into the postwar settlement. This doctrine was highly 
conditional in its acceptance of capitalist market relations (Fredriksson, 1933; 
Sweden.SOU, 1935; Myrdal, 1946; Wigforss, 1971). It held that market relations 
should be replaced by planning arrangements if they could not ensure central 
social ends such as full employment. It was in fact even expected that market 
relations would progressively fail to meet this ends, justifying a gradual 




























































































doctrine. But the Marxist element was progressively displaced in the paradigm of 
regulation in the 1950s, as a new generation of social democrats came of age in 
the context of the postwar boom. This did not necessarily imply a substantive 
rightward shift in policy. Indeed, institutionalist reformers, whose main 
intellectual mentor was Gunnar Myrdal, could be very radical, and the Rehn- 
Meidner model was a product of theirs. However on the deeper level of epistemic 
form, this shift implied a change from a strategic conception of regulation, to a 
technocratic conception, emphasizing piecemeal social engineering and 
Popperian experimentation. Marxist crisis theory was eventually displaced and 
rejected altogether (see esp. Wickman and Palsson, 1948).
This abandonment of the Marxist element facilitated, in turn, a broader 
interpellation and inclusion into social democratic discourse of yet another 
generation of social engineers in the 1960s, schooled in utilitarian variants of 
Keynesianism ("bastard" Keynesianism). Bastard Keynesianism allowed for an 
objective status of utilitarian individualism (eg Lindbeck, 1961; Feldt, 1961), that 
had been denied by Myrdal in The Political Element in the Development of 
Economic Theory (1928). The outlook of this generation had little effect on the 
mode of regulation as long as they held junior positions and as established policy 
routines were maintained. However, in the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s this 
generation had assumed senior positions at the "commanding heights" of 
regulation, and were in a positions to define the direction of the reformulation of 
policy routines, demanded by the economic crisis. After tendencies towards an 
LO-led resurrection of the Marxist-Keynesian synthesis in the 1970s (Korpi, 
1978; Meidner, 1980), the "bastard Keynesian" discourse became dominant in 
the economic policy arena in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From this vantage 
point, the crisis of the 1970s was interpreted not as a crisis of capitalism, but as a 




























































































regards to inflation (see Feldt, 1994: 12-24). Hence, a central flank of social 




























































































V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article has understood the Swedish Model as having presupposed, on 
the one hand, a domestic historic bloc under social democratic hegemonic 
leadership, and the embedded liberal world order of Pax Americana, where 
Fordist accumulation constituted the economic basis. The crisis of the Swedish 
Model and social democracy has been interpreted as an effect of transformations 
that have undermined these coexisting blocs.
Significant aspects of the crisis manifest themselves as increasingly 
powerful structural constraints on social democratic politics. The crisis of 
Fordism and attendant transformations of Sweden's productive structure and 
position in the international division of labour are fundamental in this context. 
The Swedish Model was always dependent on the export performance, and this 
imperative was enforced by the increase in social consumption that followed the 
reform wave of the early 1970s. However, though the economic stagnation of the 
mid-1970s were not caused by these reforms, the stagnation meant that the latter 
could not be underwritten through export earnings and growth. Despite a short 
term economic recovery 1982-84, the Swedish economy has continued to suffer 
from sluggish growth and has not found a new dynamic growth trajectory. Now, 
the problem is not some microeconomic inefficiency or "sclerosis", but the 
internationalization of production and the disproportionate relocation by Swedish 
firms of core economic activities on the European continent. The essay has also 
demonstrated that structural transformations have undermined the institutions of 
economic regulation of the Swedish Model. In particular one can highlight the 
increasingly fragmented mode of bargaining, but more significantly the 
breakdown of domestic as well as international arrangement of credit and 
monetary policy. Finally, the changing orientation of an increasingly 




























































































manifests itself as an external constraint on social democratic strategy. The latter 
has increased the forces of neo-liberal transformation simply by exiting from 
corporatist arrangements. This is in part an expression of the increased structural 
power that territorial non-correspondence has given business. But it is also a 
manifestation of the success of SAF and other political bodies to reshape the 
terrain of contestability in economic policy.
The importance of these imposing structural constraints notwithstanding, 
an explanation of the crisis of social democracy is not complete without a 
complementary analysis of the strategic failures and transformations within social 
democracy itself. A structural explanation, which denies the efficacy of agency 
altogether, would only be sufficient if one somehow could show that social 
democrats pursued an "optimal strategy" in the pursuit of their ends. This is not 
the case. I would highlight two instances where social democrats might have 
"acted otherwise". First, while the Meidner Plan for wage earner funds might 
have been too radical to be politically feasible, an alternative scheme based on a 
compromise between SAF's "Waldenstrom Report", and LO/SAP's proposal of 
1978, could have provided a significant pool of national and social capital (this 
would in effect have implied a much larger variant of the 4th AP pension fund). 
This might have provided a channel to control liquidity, and to transform the 
profits generated by the devaluation of 1982 into productive investments to 
support a more egalitarian type of post-Fordist development.25 It is noteworthy 
that social democrats did not even really try to mobilize to make wage earner 
funds an issue of hegemonic struggle. Fatal in this context was the inability of 
unionists and cadres in the social welfare sector to forge an alliance to push for 
this. The latter, who in the 1980s and 1990s have suffered the most under neo­
liberal restructuring were if not altogether hostile, non committal to wage earner 




























































































"norms based" monetary policy in the mid-1980s, which was based on explicit 
neoliberal neo-constitutionalist premises. This policy triggered a moral rift 
between the unions and the government and undermined all possibilities for the 
incomes policy that the devaluation strategy of 1982 presupposed. Deregulation 
of capital markets also contributed to overheating, speculation, and the financial 
crash in 1992. Hence, the downturn and the attendant fiscal imbalances became 
much more severe than it would have needed to be. Why did social democratic 
state managers become neoliberals? I have suggested that their openness to 
neoliberal ideas were the result of an increasingly technocratic form of economic 
policy discourse at the "commanding heights" of economic regulation.
What are the implications of my study for the prospects of resolving the 
crisis of social democracy. Since contingency and political choices do play a 
significant role in the crisis, and since social democratic norms continue to be 
potent at the level of "common sense" in Swedish civil society, I would argue 
that it still is fruitful to entertain such questions. But, given the structural 
constraints, how would a feasible solution look like, that could adequately 
balance accumulation, regulation, representation and legitiamation? While a 
conclusive answer on this topic lies beyond the scope of this article, I would like 
to end by laying out the direction for how one might think about this:
Micro-level studies have consistently shown that what Leborgne and 
Lipietz (1988) have called a Kalmarist?negotiated involvement type of post- 
Fordism, based on solidaristic wage norms qua the Rehn-Meidner model, micro­
level codetermination and job-sharing, is a viable basis of for an alternative 
accumulation trajectory. The problem is to realize a viable mode of regulation. 
To be adequate, such a mode would have to find a way to counteract the 
peripheralization of Sweden's productive structure, and to compel Swedish 




























































































present structure, power relations, and strategies pursued in the Swedish export 
sector. The relative role of the "traditional" transnationalizing corporations would 
have to be displaced in favor of more territorially fixed firms, willing to adopt 
"Kalmarist" production paradigms, that are producing in new core markets. It has 
been suggested that an industrial policy, based on the health, old-age services, 
and environmental-protection sectors might provide the basis for such a 
development (eg Andersson and Mjoset, 1987). This, however, would require a 
larger role of the public sector (eg pension and investment funds) in savings and 
investment (Ibid), and probably also in wage-formation legislation. An adequate 
mode would also minimize financial rents and speculation. This implies a credit 
and debit policy that minimizes the size of short-term financial flows. Examples 
of measures that might facilitate this include proactive borrowing and lending 
policies, where the state intervenes to mediate the foreign exchange needs 
generated by balance of payments deficits (eg Edin, 1993), foreign exchange 
transaction taxes (qua "the Tobin tax"), and entry into the EMU.
The EMU holds the promise of reduce the need for hedging and 
speculation on the foreign exchange markets, and therefore might reduce some of 
the material basis of the power of global finance. But the present terms of 
austerity of "Maastricht convergence" is not consistent with a full employment 
objective, and an alternative mode of regulation. As indicated in the first part of 
the paper, and alternative post-Fordist trajectory requires a "Keynesian" 
dimension of reflation to realize the productive potentials that new technology 
implies (see esp. Lipietz, 1989). This leads to the following strategic question 
with regards to the EU, that draws on my conclusion in the first section of the 
paper. Could Swedish and European social democracy take advantage of the 
reduction of territorial non-correspondence that EMU actually implies, and 




























































































One of the most significant points of my research is that the Swedish 
Model always relied on externally induced reflation for full employment, and the 
attempts to substitute this with national relfation in the 1970s and 1980s were 
abject failures. An alternative EMU might potentially ensure adequate expansion 
of transnational liquidity to regenerate a stable, non-speculative, demand-pull for 
employment and productivity growth, while domestic policy might be held 
sufficiently restrictive to support solidaristic wage policy. Such an EMU might 
be insufficient in itself, but it might provide the catalyst for a united "European 
voice" that could compel and push the Americans towards a global monetary 
reform (see Strange, 1986: 170-93). Together with other policy elements - 
promotion of eg environmental-protection sectors, coedetermination, "soidaristic 
work-policy", such a monetary policy might become part of a new social 
democratic paradigm that also address some of the central deficits of the old 
Fordist one.
But such a mode of regulation necessarily implies a strategy with a 
significant regional and transnational dimension, and it would require a change 
of attitude of red and green political groupings in Sweden, who have assumed a 
very nationalist posture with reference to European integration. This might be an 
understandable reaction to what the EU actually is today. But it does not facilitate 
a feasible strategy, given the importance of territorial non-correspondence for 
neo-liberal discipline. Therefore, the future of Sweden's left is very much tied 
with building alliances within the EU, and take advantages of the contradictions 
of neoliberalism on the European terrain discussed in the end of part one. Exit 
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1 This is a more elaborate version of an article published in Economic and Industrial 
Democracy. 20: 1 (1999). I would like to thank SAGE publications for the permission to 
reprint the article in this form. The logistical and financial supports of Arbetslivscentrum in 
Stockholm, the Social Sciences and Humanities and Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC), 
and the Jean Monnet Fellowship Programme of the EUI are gratefully appreciated. The 
material of this paper has been presented at many fora since 1993, and I have benefitted from 
the comments of many. With the usual disclaimers, I would in particular like to thank 
Gregory Albo, Robert W. Cox, Stephen Gill, Rianne Mahon, Leo Panitch, Kees van der Pijl 
and Katherine Scott.
2 This is not denied by Cox (see 1987) and Gill & Law (1989) who adopt from David Gordon 
(1980) the term "social structure of accumulation”. While being sympathetic to their attempt to 
thereby ensure a holistic conception of economics, politics and ideology, I prefer to operate with 
the regulationist distinction of "accumulation", "regulation", and "accumulation strategy". This 
is to better bring out the dialectical tension between production-technological potentials of 
accumulation and the actual constitution of accumulation through regulation.
3 Ex ante integrated wage-norms imply that wages for a given turnover period of capital are 
set before the production process begins. This ensures beforehand a given consumption 
market. Thus, risk is minimized, demand is stabilized and expanded according to anticipated 
productivity increases. This type of wage determination is said to have been pioneered with 
Henry Ford, but gained socio-economic significnace through the collective bargaining 
regimes that were instituted in the Western countries in the Thirties and the Forties. This type 
of wage relation was functional to the rather rigid industrial system of mass production that 
resulted from Taylorist principles of organization of production (Piore and Sabel, 1984: ch.
4). Keynesian macroeconomic policy and Beveridge-style social policy also facilitated such a 
stable expansion of mass consumption. The principle of social policy attributed to W.H 
Beveridge states that social welfare provision should be based on universal and equal citizen- 
entitlement. This principle lied behind heavy public investments in national health 
programmes and public housing in most western countries in the post-war period (Mishra, 
1984).
4 Turnover time is the time it takes for a unit of capital advanced (M) to realize its profit (M'). 
"Post Fordism" essentially operates by rationalizing realizing economies of this the capital 
circuit, M-C-M', in various ways. Some sectors of financial capital involved in risk-management 
and speculation realize their profits (or losses) almost instantaneously (M-M').
5 This view was recently expressed by David Harvey at the conference "World Economy and 
Nation State: between Globalization and Regionalization,” Institut fur Sozialforschung, 




























































































6 Embedded Liberalism was a compromise between the economic nationalism that had 
emerged in the West in response to the economic crisis in the 1930s and the free trade 
liberalism of the Pax Britannica era. While international multilateralism wa affirmed, it 
would not be predicated on laissez faire economic philosophy. Rather, it would be predicated 
on domestic interventionism. For that purpose the international monetary order of the Bretton 
Woods was based in the prinicple of the 'Double screen*. Liberalization and expansion of 
international trade would be facilitated by the gradual abolition of exchange controls and a 
multi91ateral fixed exchange rate regime. However, in order to ensure that these imperatives 
for international trade did not debilitate the possibility of states to pursue Keynesian policies 
and a full employment commitment, the IMF system would finance short term payments of 
deficit countries from funds provided by memebership contributions. (Due to the reluctance 
of the US administration to provide the IMF with adequate funds, this function would in 
reality be performed unilaterally by the US). In addition, the norms of the IMF stated that if 
“fundamental disequilibrium" developed, exchange rates could be altered with IMF 
concurrence. Finally, in this system, governments maintained the controls on capital markets 
that had been implemented in the 19930s and 40s. (Ruggie, 1983: 209-11).
7 Indeed, while he insists that Fordist modes of regulation were autocentric, Lipietz (1987: 31) 
calls this an "implicit (international) mode of regulation" based on a "vast catching up 
movement by Europe and Japan in relation to the United States".
8 That is, the dilemma of either restoring the domestic balance of payments equilibrium at the 
risk of triggering a world recession, or supplying dollars for the world market and exacerbating 
domestic inflation and balance of payments problems.
9 It could be argued that such self-interest policy is an expression of a lack of hegemony. But 
from a Gramscian perspective one must note that the US managed to pursue such policy with 
the consent of other states, and even diffuse its norms of post-Fordist restructuring to other 
states.
10 This is as long as a stable macroeconomic environment, supervision of international financial 
activity, and international lender of last resort functions are present to avert endogenously 
produced financial crises. According to Helleiner the "weak regime" of BIS is sufficient in this 
regard.
11 According to Kalecki, full employment could only be sustained through ambitious public 
investment programmes and certain measures of selective planning, required to deal with the 
inflationary tendencies of bottlenecks. Industrialists, he argued, would resist such policy. They 
would oppose an extensive public investment programme in principle. They would also oppose 
a policy of sustained full employment, as it would eliminate the disciplinary mechanism of "the 
sack". On the other hand, they would favour the promotion of private investment through 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy in recessions, but align with rentier interests around 
the "peril of inflation" in booms. The result of this "political business cycle", Kalecki 





























































































12 According to Swenson, the basis of legitimacy for the organized action of trade unions lies in 
the historically and socially constructed norms of a "just pay", determined by the "moral 
economy". Drawing on evidence in the work of James Scott, E.P Thompson, and Charles Sahel 
on the subjective norms of peasant-workers, as well as providing ample evidence from his own 
studies of the advanced capitalist social formations of Sweden and western Germany, Swenson 
argues that commodification of labour power never goes so far as to make instrumental criterion 
of market supply and demand the legitimate form of wage determination among workers.
Rather, workers always retain some moral notion of distributive justice regarding what they 
should be paid in relation to others. This moral conception of pay opens the space for unionism 
to take root. Unions can also to some extent mould these norms, but they break these norms at 
their peril.
13 The term "disarticulation" is borrowed from Samir Amin's version of dependency theory. 
Amin explains how a high degree of trade exposure in the core (autocentric as opposed to 
autarkic accumulation) is possible without leading to dependency and underdevelopment 
(extraverted accumulation). Anticipating Michel Aglietta's (1979) work perhaps, Amin defines 
autocentric development as the capacity of a social formation to counteract the 
overproduction/underconsumption tendency of capitalism, by expanding domestic demand in a 
manner which simultaneously counteracts the tendency of the organic composition of capital to 
increase. A necessary condition for this is that there is a synchronic expansion of productivity, 
particularly in the investment goods sector, and of real purchasing power. In this context, 
exports may be seen as providing a supplement to the domestic market, even at quite high levels 
of trade exposure, as long as a social formation can regulate the productivity-consumption 
relationship. According to Amin, the peripheral formations have never had this capacity because 
their technological potential for productivity increases is limited, and domestic demand is 
fundamentally disarticulated from supply (Amin, 1976: 76-78, 191-97)
14 The exception was United States, with significant foreign direct investments in Europe. On 
the other hand the United States is a country with very low export/import penetration and is 
certainly a country with an autocentric mode of growth.
15 A detailed account of the complex subsystem credit, tax and monetary instruments and 
policies of the postwar Swedish Model is beyond this article (See Pontusson, 1992; Notermans, 
1993: esp. 156-57; Ryner, 1996: 123, 150-51).
16 Productivity growth in the manufacturing sector was 5.8 percent during 1957-1962 and 1969- 
1974, and 8 percent 1963-1968 (IUI, 1984: 367-70; Erixon, 1991: 245). The latter rate was 
exceptional, also with comparative OECD standards, and this productivity rate coincided with a 
comparatively low profit-rate and high wage equalization. (Ibid; Erixon, 1994: 31). Sweden's 
rate of unemployment was between 1 and 2 percent throughout the postwar period, and this was 
combined with a comparatively very favourable "Phillips-curve" relation in the 1950s and 
1960s. A particularly good indication that stabilization policy was successful in regulating 
Sweden's disarticulated Fordist growth is the fact that the difference in variation of export and 




























































































social wage differentials and eliminating poverty is often cited (eg. Aberg, 1984; Olsson. 1987; 
56-62). See the latter source on welfare state expansion in the postwar period.
11 Average annual productivity growth slowed down to 0.6 percent between 1973 and 1979. 
GDP growth slowed down to an average annual rate of 2 percent. Industrial production declined 
6.2 percent between 1974 and 1982. Government net lending changed from +4 percent in 1976 
to -6 percent in 1982. By 1982 Sweden had a foreign debt of 21.7 of GDP in contrast to the 
credit position of 5.3 percent in 1974. (Ryner, 1994: 387, 391 cf. OECD, 1983: 1985: 8-9; 1989: 
11, 13)
18 The 4th AP funds and the very modestly sized wage earner funds that were implemented in 
1983 and dismantled in 1992, have a good record as investors in productive capital, but on 
much too low a scale to have any macroeconomic impact. Paradoxically the industrial policy 
instruments implemented by the Social Democrats were used by the non-socialists to meet the 
crisis in the export sector, and the result of this has served to discredit the term in Sweden. This 
is not surprising, industrial bailouts was the major cause to the rapid increase in public deficits 
and debts in the 1970s, and these bailouts were seen as failures. These policies were defensive, 
ad hoc, responding to industrial and regional interests. According to Pontusson (1992), the 
institutional design did not allow sufficient steering and was vulnerable to pressure from 
individual industries. Tripartite bargaining on the general terms for industrial restructuring was 
never successfully implemented, and in contrast to the case of the labour market board, AMS, 
they acted as "buffers" against policy control rather than as channels of control. Moreover, in 
contrast to Japan and France the capital of the Swedish investment bank was too small to have 
sufficient capacity to effectively intervene in capital markets. In addition, no serious attempt 
was made to develop a coherent substantive strategy of development.
19 The trade balance returned to positive figures in 1982, and balance of payments was achieved 
in 1984, before net-invisibles (especially interest payments) and capital outflows (especially 
FDI), made the balance of payments deficit reemerge. Profit rates and business fixed 
investments rates were restored, and government net-lending was returned to +4 percent/GDP 
by 1987, without any major cutbacks of social expenditure. Unemployment never went over 3.2 
percent in this period. (Ryner, 1994: 395-96).
20 Swedish outward FDI remained around 1 billion SEK a year in the 1970 (Larsson, 1980), and 
increased slowly to 5 billions in the early 1980s. It then shot up dramatically and reached 80 
billion SEK in the end of the decade. There have not been corresponding inflows, although there 
was an increase of such flows in the early 1990s. Portfolio equity-investment flows remained 
modest until the 1990s. At the same time investment income has been negative, thus there is 
(yet) no trend that profits on capital invested abroad is returned to Sweden. (See IMF, 1992 & 
1995; Sweden. Sveriges Riksbank, 1988 & 1992). One indication of the relocation of high 
value-added abroad is the diverging rates of productivity growth in firms of Swedish MNC’s in 
Sweden and in the EC. In the period 1986-1990, the productivity growth in the Swedish firms 
was -0.1, and 5.5 percent in the firms located in the EC. (T. Andersson, 1993).




























































































the 1920s through to the 1960s. (The all time high of 1918 was not broken until the 1970s!). 
This dormancy, despite very rapid growth, reflects the bank-centred nature and centralized 
nature of Sweden's financial system. All this changes in the 1980s, especially after 1985. when 
the annual turnover increased from a couple of million Crowns (1985 prices), to over 120 (XX) 
million Crowns in 1990(Erixon, 1991 cf Affarsvarlden).
“  Since 1982, the Swedish Krona had been pegged to a "currency basket", and in 1990 
monetary policy was further tightened through a peg to the EMS.
21 Indeed, a central theme in Feldt's (1991) autocritique is that the policy measures were not 
pedagogically explained and grounded in the movement.
.The 1992/93 state bail-out of Nordbanken, Gotabanken and Forsta Sparbanken cost SEK 67.5 
billion (Brown-Humes, 1993). This equals the total 1991/92 budgets for the Labour Market and 
Defense Ministries. Sweden's employee health insurance system, with 100 percent coverage 
from the first day of illness, which was the focus of SAFs crusade against the unreasonable 
extravagant decadence of the welfare state in the late 1980s, cost SEK 8 billion in 1991/92 
(Sweden.Ministry of Finance, 1992).
24 For detailed analysis of the causes of the Swedish deficit, see Ljunggren (1993).
25 One major cutback was already implemented by the social democratic administration in 1991, 
after a less spectacular run of the Crown: Daily sickness benefits for the first three days of 
absence were reduced from 90 to 65 percent of the wage. After the run of 1992, bipartisan 
packages were concluded by Carl Bildt's centre-right administration and the SAP, then in 
opposition. In exchange for non-socialist recindance to unilateral moves to privatization of 
public enterprises, and major changes to labour and social legislation, SAP agreed to support 
reductions of long term sickness insurance (after three days) from 90 to 80 percent the first year 
and 70 percent thereafter, and increase of the retiring age from 65 to 66, and to remove the 
entire system from the state budget to a bipartite arrangement (attenuating the universalism of 
the system). Since this time there have been further cutbacks of child allowances, parental 
insurance and unemployment insurance, both by the pre- 1994 non-socialist and post-1994 
socialist administrations. The social democrats initially introduced an austerity package that 
protected the latter programmes (the Persson Plan", but as a result of the "Peso Crisis" of early 
1995, they had to cut into these programmes as well. The principle that has been followed is that 
of sickness insurance: reductions from full compensation of wage-loss to 60-75 percent, and 
waiting days, and a return to employee contributions and user fees. Social services, as opposed 
to transfer payments have been less affected to date, but may be the next programmes in line. 
The Peso Crisis indicates the peril of exposing the debt to short term financial markets. Sweden 
had nothing to do with the crisis in question, but it nevertheless generated a massive selloff of 
Swedish bonds on the market. This was because high risk takers had borrowed short on 
American markets to invest in Swedish bonds in order to profit from interest differentials. 
However, when the American government presented the rescue package to Mexico, it cut into 




























































































accelerator-effect, as the value of the Crown deterirated sharply, despite the fact that Sweden 
had made significant headway in terms of financial consolidation. (1 am grateful to Dan Olsson, 
financial reporter for Tidningamas Telegrambyra, for helping me clarifying the relationship 
between the Peso Crisis and the 1995 ran on the Crown.)
26 We can only speculate on how effective such a strategy would have been, but it is hard to 
imagine that the result would have been any more disastrous to the Swedish economy than what 
occurred in the early 1990s. Moreover, Pontusson (1992), who pursues an argument similar to 
mine here, provides evidence that the limited wage earner funds that nevertheless were 
implemented, and the 4th AP pension fund, have a good record as investors in productive 
capital. On the prospects of an industrial policy based on spinoffs of the welfare sector, see J.O 
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